Towards a Conversation Across Civilisations

It has become increasingly difficult to engage in reasonable discussions about the state of the world amid rising international tensions. The present environment of global instability and conflict has emerged over the course of the past fifteen years driven by, on the one hand, the growing weakness of the principal North Atlantic states, led by the United States – which we call the West – and, on the other, the increasing assertion of large developing countries, exemplified by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). This group of states, along with several others, have built the material conditions for their own development agendas, including for the next generation of technology, a sector that had previously been the monopoly of Western states and firms through the World Trade Organisation’s intellectual property rights regime. Alongside the BRICS, the construction of regional trade and development projects in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that are not controlled by the Western states or Western-dominated institutions – including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (2001) the Belt and Road Initiative (2013), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (2011), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (2022) – heralds the emergence of a new international economic order.

Since the world financial crisis of 2007–08, the United States and its North Atlantic allies have become acutely aware that their hegemonic status in the world has deteriorated. This decline is the consequence of three key forms of overreach: first, military overreach through both enormous military expenditure and warfare; second, financial overreach caused by the rampant waste of social wealth into the unproductive financial sector along with the widespread imposition of sanctions, dollar hegemony, and control of international financial mechanisms (such as SWIFT); and, third, economic overreach, due to the investment and tax strike of a minuscule section of the world’s population, who are solely fixated on filling their already immense private coffers. This overreach has led to the fragility of the Western states, which are less able to exercise their authority around the world. In reaction to their own weakness and the new developments in the Global South, the United States has led its allies in launching a comprehensive pressure campaign against what it considers to be its ‘near peer rivals’, namely China and Russia. This hostile foreign policy, which includes a trade war, unilateral sanctions, aggressive diplomacy, and military operations, is now commonly known as the New Cold War.

In addition to these tangible measures, information warfare is a key element of the New Cold War. In Western societies today, any effort to promote a balanced and reasonable conversation about China and Russia, or indeed about the leading states in the developing world, is relentlessly attacked by state, corporate, and media institutions as disinformation, propaganda, and foreign interference. Even established facts, let alone alternative perspectives, are treated as matters of dispute. Consequently, it has become virtually impossible to engage in constructive discussions about the changing world order, the new trade and development regimes, or the urgent matters which require global cooperation such as climate change, poverty, and inequality, without being dismissed. In this context, dialogue between intellectuals in countries such as China with their counterparts in the West has broken down. Similarly, dialogue between intellectuals in countries of the Global South and China has also been hampered by the New Cold War, which has strained the already weak communication channels within the developing world. As a result, the conceptual landscape, terms of reference, and key debates that are taking place within China are almost entirely unknown outside of the country, which makes the holding of rational cross-country discussions very difficult.

The New Cold War has led to an enormous spike in Sinophobia and anti-Asian racism in the Western states, frequently egged on by political leaders. The rise in Sinophobia has deepened the lack of genuine engagement by Western intellectuals with contemporary Chinese perspectives, discussions, and debates; and due to the immense power of Western information flows around the world, these dismissive attitudes have also grown in many developing countries. Although there are increasing numbers of international students in China, these students tend to study technical subjects and generally do not focus on or participate in the broader political discussions within and about China.

In the current global climate of conflict and division, it is essential to develop lines of communication and encourage exchange between China, the West, and the developing world. The range of political thinking and discourse within China is immense, stretching from a variety of Marxist approaches to the ardent advocacy of neoliberalism, from deep historical examinations of Chinese civilisation to the deep wells of patriotic thought that have grown in the recent period. Far from static, these intellectual trends have evolved over time and interact with each other. A rich variety of Marxist thinking, from Maoism to creative Marxism, has emerged in China; although these trends all focus on socialist theories, history, and experiments, each trend has developed a distinct school of thought with its own internal discourse as well as debates with other traditions. Meanwhile, the landscape of patriotic thinking is far more eclectic, with some tendencies overlapping with Marxist trends, which is understandable given the connections between Marxism and national liberation; whereas others are closer to offering culturalist explanations for China’s developmental advances. This diversity of thought is not reflected in external understandings or representations of China – even in the scholarly literature – which instead largely reproduces the postures of the New Cold War.

To contribute to the development of a better understanding of and engagement with the thinking and discussions taking place within China, Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research and Dongsheng have partnered with?Wenhua Zongheng?(文化縱橫), a leading journal of contemporary Chinese political and cultural thought. Founded in 2008, the journal is an important reference for debates and intellectual developments taking place in the country, publishing issues every two months which feature articles by intellectuals from a range of professions across the entire country. In this partnership, Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research and Dongsheng will publish an international edition of?Wenhua Zongheng, releasing four issues per year in English, Portuguese, and Spanish, which will be curated by our joint editorial team. The international edition will include translations of a selection of articles from the original Chinese editions that hold particular significance for the Global South. Additionally, Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research will run a column in the Chinese edition of?Wenhua Zongheng, bringing voices from Africa, Asia, and Latin America in dialogue with China (some of which will also be published in the international edition). We are excited to undertake this project and hope that it will introduce readers to the vibrant discourse underway in China, share important perspectives from the Global South with a Chinese audience, and enrich international dialogue and understanding. Instead of the global division pursued by the New Cold War, our mission is to learn from each other towards a world of collaboration rather than confrontation.

尊敬的讀者朋友們：

自2008年創(chuàng)刊以來(lái)，《文化縱橫》始終堅(jiān)持“以中國(guó)為方法”，致力于圍繞中國(guó)發(fā)展經(jīng)驗(yàn)開(kāi)展理論探索。世界百年未有之大變局下，《文化縱橫》國(guó)際傳播系列希望以中國(guó)人自己的聲音，向世界各國(guó)特別是廣大發(fā)展中國(guó)家介紹中國(guó)的發(fā)展道路，呈現(xiàn)中國(guó)式現(xiàn)代化的進(jìn)程與面貌，并展示中國(guó)思想界在國(guó)際體系變化之際的態(tài)度與思索。

《文化縱橫》

不是Beijing Cultural Review

而是Wén huà zòng héng

《文化縱橫》國(guó)際傳播系列由三大洲社會(huì)研究所（Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, 網(wǎng)站：www.thetricontinental.org）和東聲（Dongsheng News，網(wǎng)站：www.dongshengnews.org)協(xié)作翻譯并制作，有英語(yǔ)、西語(yǔ)、葡語(yǔ)三個(gè)版本。每期根據(jù)不同主題，從《文化縱橫》雜志過(guò)往發(fā)表文章中，選擇3-5篇文章進(jìn)行編譯，預(yù)計(jì)每季度發(fā)布一期。2023年第1期主題為“重構(gòu)現(xiàn)代世界體系”，主要分析全球緊張局勢(shì)加劇背景下的俄烏戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的全球影響，追溯中西關(guān)系的歷史軌跡，并探討團(tuán)結(jié)廣大第三世界國(guó)家、推動(dòng)構(gòu)建新型國(guó)際體系的可能性。包括以下四篇文章：

The Ukraine Crisis and the Building of a New International System

‘The Ukraine Crisis and the Building of a New International System’ was originally published as the lead article of the June 2022 issue of?Wenhua Zongheng?(文化縱橫). The article urges China, amid the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, to consider the dangers of the current international system that it has been striving to integrate into and the possibilities of building a new international system.

The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis has not merely altered the geopolitical landscape, it has severely disrupted the current international order. Particularly, the imposition of extensive sanctions on Russia by the United States and other Western countries has compromised the rules of the existing international system and revealed its true, coercive nature. This crisis should provide a strong reminder to China that it must deepen its ‘worst-case scenario thinking’ (底線思維, dǐxiàn sīwéi) and seriously contemplate, as a major strategic aim, building a new international system parallel to the current Western-dominated order.

▍Preparing for Looming Crises

The current international system is one that is dominated by the Western countries, led by the United States, and liberal capitalist in nature. During periods when liberal capitalism functions smoothly, this system expands globally and appears to be rules-based and fair, able to include most countries and regions of the world. However, during periods of crisis, liberal capitalism will contort itself, abandoning established international rules or seeking to create new ones, exemplified by increasing nativism or deglobalisation where the hegemonic nation relinquishes its purported duties of leadership and returns to power politics.

Amidst the Ukraine crisis, the US and the Western countries have disregarded international norms by forcibly casting Russia out of the global financial architecture, namely the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), confiscating Russian state and personal assets, and freezing the country’s foreign exchange reserves. Such measures go far beyond the typical nonviolent means of confrontation employed by nation states such as trade wars, technology blockades, and oil embargoes, and blatantly contradicts the timeless liberal principles that ‘debts must be paid’ and ‘private property is sacrosanct’, among others. These flagrant violations of the so-called ‘rules-based order’ have laid bare the arbitrary, unlawful, and biased character of the international system and the manner in which it can be manipulated by the US and its allies to violently discipline other countries.

From the Chinese perspective, the Ukraine crisis is a warning to China that it must prepare for scenarios in which it is subject to such hostile measures. It is necessary to re-examine the present international order to grasp an accurate understanding of both its benefits and drawbacks, giving up any illusions in its fairness and long-term viability, and, whilst participating in and maximising the utility of the current system, simultaneously making preparations for the construction of a new international order.

Given the size of China, the task of national rejuvenation requires much more than an economic strategy of mere ‘domestic circulation’ (內(nèi)循環(huán), nèi xúnhuán). To achieve industrialisation and modernisation, China must engage with the world and develop a broader ‘international circulation’ (外循環(huán), wài xúnhuán) by accessing external resources, technologies, and markets. The central task of China’s reform and opening-up policy over the past four decades has been to open the country to the outside world and participate in the global system in order to promote an international environment more favourable to the pursuit of modernisation.?At the same time, China has had to take necessary actions when hostile aspects of the current system have threatened the country’s fundamental interests. In the current situation, it is necessary that China, on the one hand, fights steadfastly against the manipulation of the existing system by the US and the Western countries, and, on the other hand, begins to build a new, more democratic and just global system, in partnership with developing countries.

▍China’s Historical Destiny Is to Stand With the Third World

The present world order has not only been shaped by China, Russia, the United States, and Europe, the countries and regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have also created a multitude of new regional networks amid the decline of US power. Working with other developing countries is necessary for China to strengthen efforts to build a new international system. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), since it was proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013, has in fact laid the foundation for such cooperation and for the realisation of a new system.

Since the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, the Third World has consistently provided China with new spaces to survive and grow and new sources of strength whenever it has faced pressure from superpowers, including the national liberation movements of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s, the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the Non-Aligned Movement, Mao Zedong’s Three Worlds theory developed in the 1970s, the emphasis on South-South cooperation during the early stages of reform and opening up in the 1980s, the establishment of the BRICS mechanism at the turn of the century, and, most recently, the development of the BRI in the last decade. Over the past 70 years, China has had adopted a wide range of foreign policies, from the ‘lean to one side’ (一邊倒, yībiāndǎo) policy with the Soviet Union in the 1950s to the ‘integrating with the world’ (與國(guó)際接軌, yǔ guójì jiēguǐ) (or with the US, to be exact) policy at the turn of the century; however, China has, consciously or unconsciously, consistently turned to the Third World whenever it has felt that its independence and sovereignty were threatened.

This relationship with the Third World is China’s historic destiny. Today, as China becomes an important pole in the world and is faced with the hostile containment strategy of the hegemonic United States, it cannot follow the alliance politics pursued by the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Dividing the world into antagonistic blocs would drive humanity to the brink of war and global catastrophe; instead, China should continue to pursue an independent and nonaligned foreign policy, focused on bringing together the many countries of the Third World – which constitute the global majority – to foster new forms of partnership, establish new multilateral networks, and create a new international system.

Reflecting upon the practices and experiences of the BRI until now and accounting for the challenges posed by the Ukraine crisis, China’s approach towards building a new international system should be guided by the following considerations:

First, China’s orientation should be based on strategic rather than commercial interests. China cannot merely be concerned with exporting its production capacity and capital or securing access to external resources and markets for Chinese enterprises; but rather it must prioritise what is necessary to ensure strategic survival and national development. By adopting such a strategic perspective, it becomes clear that the approach taken by many Chinese firms and local governments towards other nations and regions, as part of the BRI, is not sustainable as it has prioritised commercial interests and tended to ignore political-strategic interests.

Second, the creation of the new international system requires the development of a new vision, philosophy, and ideology to guide and inspire efforts to build it. In this regard, the BRI’s principles of ‘consultation, contribution, and shared benefits’ (共商共建共享, gòngshāng gòngjiàn gòngxiǎng) are insufficient. While the United States today rallies the Western camp under the banner of ‘democracy versus authoritarianism’, China must clearly uphold the flag of peace and development, uniting and leading the vast developing world whilst appealing to and persuading more European states to join this cause. President Xi Jinping’s global call for the ‘building of a community with a shared future for humanity’ (人類(lèi)命運(yùn)共同體, rénlèi mìngyùn gòngtóngtǐ) should be adapted to the new international situation. The Chinese concept of ‘common prosperity and common development’ should be shared with the world and promoted as a core value in building a new international system.

Third, a ‘Development International’ (發(fā)展國(guó)際, fāzhǎn guójì) should be set up as an institutional entity to create a new global system. Unlike the Western alliance mechanisms, such as the Group of Seven (G7) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) which are dominated by a minority of wealthy countries, a new global system must address the fundamental issue that the overwhelming majority of the world faces: how developing countries can be more effectively organised under the principle of nonalignment. Loosely organised and nonbinding initiatives such as conferences and declarations are wholly inadequate for this task; an institutional mechanism such as a ‘Development International’ should be promoted and constructed to drive more powerful organisational action and to develop networks of knowledge and culture, of media and communication, of economic cooperation, as well as other projects. In a nutshell, forms of organisational action under the mandate of peace and development should be established and experimented with.

▍The Relationship Between the Two Systems

Building a new system does not mean abandoning the present one.

In the forty years of reform and opening up, China’s direction and goal have been to integrate into the existing international order. As a latecomer to industrialisation and modernisation, China has had no choice but to learn from the Western countries and take in their advanced knowledge and experience. Breaking away from this system would inevitably drive China back to the old road of the ‘closed-door’ (閉關(guān)鎖國(guó), bìguānsuǒguó) policy of the 1960s and 1970s, cutting the country off from the advanced economies of the present world.

Nowadays, China has travelled a long way down the road of globalisation and has benefited from it; reform and opening up has become bound up with the Chinese people’s basic interests. For this reason, it is neither desirable nor feasible to give up the benefits derived from participating in the current system.

But this by no means negates the urgent necessity of preparing for the threat of the US-led Western alliance sabotaging the present global system. The development of a new international system and the active participation in the present system are two processes that can be implemented simultaneously without conflict, in which the two systems are bound to overlap and interpenetrate each other. When the quantitative changes accumulated by the new system begin to transform into qualitative changes, a brand-new world order will naturally emerge.

烏克蘭危機(jī)與新型國(guó)際體系構(gòu)建

烏克蘭危機(jī)的爆發(fā)，在改變地緣政治格局的同時(shí)，也動(dòng)搖了現(xiàn)行國(guó)際秩序。尤其當(dāng)美國(guó)等西方國(guó)家對(duì)俄羅斯施加了大量違背現(xiàn)行國(guó)際體系規(guī)則的制裁時(shí)，這一體系的暴力本質(zhì)便暴露無(wú)遺。它強(qiáng)烈地提醒中國(guó)人，必須加大底線思維力度，認(rèn)真思考構(gòu)建與現(xiàn)行以西方為主導(dǎo)的國(guó)際體系相平行的新型國(guó)際體系這一重大戰(zhàn)略問(wèn)題。

▍應(yīng)為可能的危機(jī)預(yù)作準(zhǔn)備

現(xiàn)行國(guó)際體系，是以美國(guó)為首的西方主導(dǎo)控制的國(guó)際體系，其實(shí)質(zhì)是自由主義資本主義國(guó)際體系。當(dāng)自由資本主義運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)順暢時(shí)，這一體系向著全球覆蓋，并顯現(xiàn)出規(guī)則性和中立性，能夠?qū)⒋蠖鄶?shù)國(guó)家和地區(qū)容納進(jìn)來(lái)。而當(dāng)自由資本主義運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)不暢，這一體系便會(huì)扭曲，逆全球化上升，霸主國(guó)家放棄領(lǐng)導(dǎo)責(zé)任，實(shí)力政治回歸，或拋棄國(guó)際規(guī)則，或另起爐灶重建規(guī)則。

此次烏克蘭危機(jī)，美國(guó)等西方國(guó)家違背國(guó)際規(guī)則，強(qiáng)行將俄羅斯踢出國(guó)際金融結(jié)算系統(tǒng)（SWIFT），沒(méi)收俄羅斯國(guó)家或個(gè)人資產(chǎn)，凍結(jié)俄羅斯外匯儲(chǔ)備，其手段遠(yuǎn)超貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)、技術(shù)封鎖、石油禁運(yùn)等原有的民族國(guó)家間非暴力對(duì)抗手段，而是公然違背“欠債還錢(qián)”“私有財(cái)產(chǎn)神圣不可侵犯”等古老又現(xiàn)代的原則，充分暴露出現(xiàn)行國(guó)際體系非規(guī)則性、非中立性的一面，以及美國(guó)西方操控的國(guó)際體系的暴力政治的本質(zhì)。

烏克蘭危機(jī)提示中國(guó)人，必須為類(lèi)似的危機(jī)預(yù)作準(zhǔn)備。其中的核心要義，在于重新審視當(dāng)今國(guó)際秩序，準(zhǔn)確把握其中的利與弊，放棄幻想，在參與并用好現(xiàn)有的國(guó)際體系的同時(shí)，盡快準(zhǔn)備新型國(guó)際體系的構(gòu)建。

以中國(guó)的體量，欲完成民族復(fù)興偉業(yè)，僅僅局限于“內(nèi)循環(huán)”是不夠的。中國(guó)的工業(yè)化和現(xiàn)代化，必然要走出去，通過(guò)利用外部資源、技術(shù)和市場(chǎng)，形成廣泛的外循環(huán)。中國(guó)近40年改革開(kāi)放的核心任務(wù)之一，就是對(duì)外開(kāi)放，加入現(xiàn)有國(guó)際體系，搭建有利于中國(guó)現(xiàn)代化的國(guó)際關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)。然而，當(dāng)現(xiàn)行國(guó)際體系發(fā)生扭曲變形，并可能傷害到中國(guó)的根本利益時(shí)，中國(guó)當(dāng)然要有所行動(dòng)。一方面，要通過(guò)堅(jiān)定的斗爭(zhēng)，抗衡美國(guó)等西方國(guó)家對(duì)現(xiàn)行國(guó)際體系的操控；另一方面，則應(yīng)逐漸搭建以中國(guó)為主導(dǎo)的新型國(guó)際體系。

▍選擇第三世界國(guó)家是中國(guó)的歷史宿命

當(dāng)今世界，中、俄、美、歐之外，是廣大的亞、非、拉國(guó)家和地區(qū)，是美國(guó)力量收縮之后的大量新中間地帶。向這些國(guó)家和地區(qū)尋找新的力量源泉，是中國(guó)建構(gòu)新型國(guó)際體系的當(dāng)然選擇。起自2013年，由習(xí)近平主席倡導(dǎo)的“一帶一路”倡議，事實(shí)上已經(jīng)構(gòu)成了新型國(guó)際體系的實(shí)現(xiàn)基礎(chǔ)。

新中國(guó)成立以來(lái)，每當(dāng)中國(guó)在超級(jí)大國(guó)壓迫之下欲尋找新的生存發(fā)展空間和新的力量來(lái)源時(shí)，第三世界國(guó)家便會(huì)自動(dòng)成為不二選擇。從上世紀(jì)50~60年代的亞非拉民族解放運(yùn)動(dòng)，到70年代毛澤東的“三個(gè)世界理論”，從80年代改革開(kāi)放時(shí)代對(duì)于“南南合作”的熱情推動(dòng)，到世紀(jì)之交“金磚五國(guó)”機(jī)制的探索，乃至最近10年的“一帶一路”倡議。這70多年間，雖然經(jīng)歷了50年代對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的“一邊倒”，經(jīng)歷了世紀(jì)之交的“與國(guó)際接軌”（實(shí)質(zhì)是與美國(guó)接軌），但只要中國(guó)感受到獨(dú)立自主地位面臨威脅時(shí)，便會(huì)自覺(jué)不自覺(jué)地轉(zhuǎn)向廣大的第三世界。

這恐怕就是中國(guó)的歷史宿命。當(dāng)今日中國(guó)已經(jīng)崛起為世界一極，并面臨霸主美國(guó)的全面遏制之時(shí)，它的選擇并不會(huì)重復(fù)蘇聯(lián)和美國(guó)的結(jié)盟政治道路，以集團(tuán)對(duì)抗助推世界走向危險(xiǎn)的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)邊緣，而是始終保持不結(jié)盟的獨(dú)立自主姿態(tài)，同時(shí)將更廣大的第三世界國(guó)家團(tuán)結(jié)起來(lái)，構(gòu)建新型伙伴型關(guān)系，由此形成獨(dú)特的新型國(guó)際關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)和新型國(guó)際體系。

總結(jié)“一帶一路”迄今為止的實(shí)踐，面對(duì)烏克蘭危機(jī)之際的挑戰(zhàn)，這一新型國(guó)際體系應(yīng)該具備如下特質(zhì)：

第一，這一體系應(yīng)該是戰(zhàn)略性的，而非商業(yè)性的。它不僅是中國(guó)的產(chǎn)能輸出與資本輸出需求，也不僅是中國(guó)企業(yè)走出去尋找外部資源與外部市場(chǎng)的需求，而且是服從于中國(guó)的戰(zhàn)略發(fā)展與戰(zhàn)略生存的根本需求。在這樣的戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)下，目前中國(guó)許多企業(yè)和地區(qū)對(duì)“一帶一路”沿線國(guó)家只講商業(yè)利益、不講政治戰(zhàn)略利益的行為便是不可持續(xù)的。

第二，新型國(guó)際體系的構(gòu)建必須有新的理念和愿景，必須有新型意識(shí)形態(tài)的指引，工具方法層面的“共商、共建、共享”是遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不夠的。今日美國(guó)，以“民主vs威權(quán)”為旗幟團(tuán)結(jié)西方陣營(yíng)，中國(guó)應(yīng)鮮明地舉起“和平與發(fā)展”的旗幟，團(tuán)結(jié)帶領(lǐng)廣大的發(fā)展中世界，并說(shuō)服影響更多的歐洲國(guó)家。“人類(lèi)命運(yùn)共同體”在新的形勢(shì)下應(yīng)得到新的解釋?zhuān)袊?guó)的“共同富裕與共同發(fā)展”模式應(yīng)該在構(gòu)建新型國(guó)際體系時(shí)作為核心價(jià)值輸出到全世界。

第三，新型國(guó)際體系應(yīng)以“發(fā)展國(guó)際”作為組織載體。相比于G7、北約等西方國(guó)家結(jié)盟機(jī)制，廣大發(fā)展中國(guó)家在不結(jié)盟機(jī)制下如何進(jìn)行高效的組織動(dòng)員，是擺在新型國(guó)際體系構(gòu)建面前的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵課題。在這方面，僅有松散的論壇、項(xiàng)目等組織形式是遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不夠的，應(yīng)推動(dòng)形成類(lèi)似“發(fā)展國(guó)際”的組織機(jī)制，推動(dòng)更加強(qiáng)有力的組織行動(dòng)，并在此基礎(chǔ)上，形成發(fā)展國(guó)際知識(shí)與文化網(wǎng)絡(luò)、發(fā)展國(guó)際媒體與傳播網(wǎng)絡(luò)、發(fā)展國(guó)際工商企業(yè)合作網(wǎng)絡(luò)等組織機(jī)制?？傊?，要探索和形成以“和平與發(fā)展”為主題的國(guó)際性的組織行動(dòng)。

▍如何處理兩種國(guó)際體系的關(guān)系

構(gòu)建新型國(guó)際體系，并不意味著拋棄現(xiàn)有的國(guó)際體系。

改革開(kāi)放40年，中國(guó)就是以融入現(xiàn)有國(guó)際體系為方向和目標(biāo)的。由于中國(guó)在工業(yè)化和現(xiàn)代化道路上后來(lái)者的身份，向西方世界學(xué)習(xí)，吸收其先進(jìn)的知識(shí)和經(jīng)驗(yàn)，就成為不二選擇。一旦脫離這一體系，中國(guó)勢(shì)必會(huì)回到上世紀(jì)60~70年代“閉關(guān)鎖國(guó)”的道路，與現(xiàn)有世界的先進(jìn)部分喪失聯(lián)系。

今天，中國(guó)已經(jīng)在全球化的道路上愈走愈遠(yuǎn)，成為全球化的受益者，改革開(kāi)放已經(jīng)成為中國(guó)人民的根本利益。因此，放棄這一參與現(xiàn)行國(guó)際體系而來(lái)的根本利益，既不可取，也不可行。

但這絕不意味著我們對(duì)于以美國(guó)為首的西方世界破壞現(xiàn)行國(guó)際秩序的危險(xiǎn)不做準(zhǔn)備。應(yīng)該認(rèn)識(shí)到，發(fā)展建設(shè)新型國(guó)際體系是可以與積極參與建設(shè)現(xiàn)行國(guó)際體系并行不悖、互不沖突的。新的體系是增量，舊的體系是存量，它們一定會(huì)你中有我，我中有你。當(dāng)新體系的發(fā)展由量變達(dá)到質(zhì)變的時(shí)刻，一個(gè)嶄新的世界秩序就會(huì)自然形成。

本文發(fā)表于《文化縱橫》2022年6月刊，該期目錄如下，歡迎訂閱紙刊查看更多內(nèi)容：

— ?2022年6月新刊目錄??—

▍編輯手記

烏克蘭危機(jī)與新型國(guó)際體系構(gòu)建

《文化縱橫》編輯部

▍域外

擺脫“資源詛咒”？——海灣六國(guó)的工業(yè)化與經(jīng)濟(jì)多元化

張若楓

白宮新一代對(duì)華戰(zhàn)略操盤(pán)手的思想素描

楊博文

▍封面選題：巨變來(lái)臨——俄烏沖突改變世界

俄烏沖突在2022 年爆發(fā)，以出人意料的方式改變著整個(gè)世界格局。沖突爆發(fā)以來(lái)，以美國(guó)為首的西方把國(guó)際規(guī)則作為武器對(duì)俄進(jìn)行輪番制裁，深刻且全面地動(dòng)搖“二戰(zhàn)”后幾十年來(lái)的國(guó)際治理體系，和平與發(fā)展的時(shí)代主題面臨前所未有的挑戰(zhàn)。俄烏沖突后的世界將向何處去？

跨越俄烏沖突陷阱：重新思考以規(guī)則為核心的國(guó)際秩序

曹遠(yuǎn)征

構(gòu)建“新三環(huán)”：面對(duì)全面脫鉤可能的中國(guó)選擇

程亞文

作為帝國(guó)間沖突的俄烏戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)

張昕

歐洲為什么不能掌控自己的命運(yùn)？

魏南枝

重振領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力：俄烏沖突中的英國(guó)戰(zhàn)略

孔元

▍專(zhuān)題：人類(lèi)文明新形態(tài)

強(qiáng)世功

正是在這短短十幾年中，中國(guó)看待世界的眼光和心態(tài)也悄然發(fā)生了變化：從凸顯中國(guó)特色的特殊主義敘事，轉(zhuǎn)向更為包容世界的普遍主義敘事；從追求被西方承認(rèn)的刻意努力，轉(zhuǎn)向平和心態(tài)的自我認(rèn)同。這種變化最直觀地體現(xiàn)在兩次奧運(yùn)會(huì)的開(kāi)幕式上。

王立勝、晏擴(kuò)明

▍觀念

史觀重建：從“主旋律”到“新主流”

陶慶梅

2021年《覺(jué)醒年代》《山海情》等作品的出現(xiàn)，不但打破了“主旋律”與大眾文化之間的界限，在市場(chǎng)上創(chuàng)造出良好的口碑；更重要的是，它們通過(guò)開(kāi)辟一種新的歷史敘事方式，呼應(yīng)了這個(gè)時(shí)代被掩藏著的某種社會(huì)情緒，帶動(dòng)了更多年輕觀眾的情感，造就了屬于這個(gè)時(shí)代的主流價(jià)值。

周安安、吳靖

從“未來(lái)人”到“頑童”——日本動(dòng)漫與社會(huì)秩序的張力

潘妮妮

從不同時(shí)期的代表性作者與作品中，我們看到了日本動(dòng)漫文化中未成年人位置的變遷：從改造世界的“未來(lái)人”，到被教養(yǎng)的未成年人，再到輕視成人世界并主動(dòng)疏離的“頑童”。這反映了并不存在一個(gè)價(jià)值統(tǒng)一的日本動(dòng)漫文化，正如戰(zhàn)后日本成人社會(huì)的思潮也并非始終如一。

▍社會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)變遷

“波蘭尼時(shí)刻”在當(dāng)代中國(guó)

酈菁

中國(guó)無(wú)法避免全球“波蘭尼時(shí)刻”重現(xiàn)帶來(lái)的社會(huì)壓力和不確定性；并且，由于自身龐大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體量和重要的政治地位，中國(guó)必將在其中扮演重要的角色。

▍公益理論與公益實(shí)踐

社會(huì)組織專(zhuān)業(yè)化的中國(guó)實(shí)踐：慈弘基金會(huì)的探索

張婧

▍反思美國(guó)模式

重新審視“地緣政治學(xué)”——一個(gè)世界史的視角

方旭

韓國(guó)“單一民族”的神話與現(xiàn)實(shí)

鄭立菲

《文化縱橫》國(guó)際傳播系列由三大洲社會(huì)研究所（Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, 網(wǎng)站：www.thetricontinental.org）和東聲（Dongsheng News，網(wǎng)站：www.dongshengnews.org)協(xié)作翻譯并制作，有英語(yǔ)、西語(yǔ)、葡語(yǔ)三個(gè)版本。每期根據(jù)不同主題，從《文化縱橫》雜志過(guò)往發(fā)表文章中，選擇3-5篇文章進(jìn)行編譯，預(yù)計(jì)每季度發(fā)布一期。2023年第1期主題為“重構(gòu)現(xiàn)代世界體系”，主要分析全球緊張局勢(shì)加劇背景下的俄烏戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的全球影響，追溯中西關(guān)系的歷史軌跡，并探討團(tuán)結(jié)廣大第三世界國(guó)家、推動(dòng)構(gòu)建新型國(guó)際體系的可能性。

Building the New ‘Three Rings’: Reconfiguring China’s Foreign Relations in the Face of Decoupling

The ‘special military operation’ launched by Russia against Ukraine, along with the attendant stalemate that has set in between the West and Russia, are landmark events that signal the approaching end of the globalisation wave that began in the 1980s. The absurd efforts of the United States to bully its allies into enacting murderous sanctions against Russia and to browbeat other countries into taking sides in this conflict, have brought the world to a state reminiscent of the deadly global struggles of the twentieth century ago. These developments pose a major challenge to China; the end of this wave of globalisation means that the country will no longer have the same external environment for development that it has enjoyed for the past forty years, and that the US will likely intensify its push to re-establish its domination over the international system and to decouple from China and Russia. The world has undergone a paradigm shift.?In the face of a potential forced and complete decoupling from the United States and Western countries, China must take initiative and adjust its foreign strategic orientation, reprioritising the countries that it engages with in order to develop a new international order that would safeguard against the repercussions of this decoupling.

The Unspoken Rule of the International Order: The Centre-Periphery Power Structure

During the three decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations between Russia and the West have vacillated. Initially, Russia pursued friendly ties with the US and Western countries, then it gradually grew apart from them, and now it has entered into a fierce confrontation. The evolution of this relationship reflects the political limits of globalisation. Unlike the romantic notions of globalisation that were ascendant following the end of the Cold War, in reality, this era saw the establishment of US hegemony and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. This process of globalisation and the US pursuit of global supremacy are two sides of the coin; they condition and promote each other. The inability of this system to promote international equality, with developed and developing countries locked into a relationship of dominator and follower states, means that it cannot continue endlessly. On the one hand, globalisation is abandoned, reversed, or redesigned when it backfires on its initiators, threatening their superiority; on the other hand, countries will continue to resist when powerful states relentlessly pursue domination.?Russia’s special military operation against Ukraine was the result of the domineering nature of this round of globalisation, and has brought the US-dominated system to a standstill.

The decades-long eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was the main reason for Russia’s preemptive strike. This military buildup was not only a security issue but also an economic issue, as part of US efforts to marginalise Russia. Russia’s efforts to leverage globalisation to achieve national development and become a central country in the world order, ran counter to the logic of US-led globalisation. Global capital, financial capital in particular, has mainly concentrated on Russia’s energy, grains, and minerals, sectors which it can exploit for extravagant profits. However, during the tenure of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, the state has strengthened its grip on key sectors concerning national security and people’s livelihoods, and has sought to build a Eurasian economic union to create space for its own economic growth; all of this has upset foreign capital. NATO’s eastward expansion is a manifestation of capital’s control over politics to achieve market expansion. If Russia cannot respond effectively to the efforts to squeeze its development space and exacerbate its marginalisation, it will become even more deeply confined to being a producer of primary goods and lose access to great power politics, increasing the likelihood of a domestic political crisis, which Russian elites wish to avoid.

The power structure of the contemporary world order has been laid bare by NATO’s eastern expansion and the comprehensive sanctions regime imposed by Western countries on Russia. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the European colonial system began to fade out and, during the last half of the twentieth century, the world order became centred on the United Nations and international law, namely the principle of the sovereign equality of states. However, the hierarchical centre-periphery order of the European colonial system has not actually disappeared, but instead continues to exist in an implicit and hidden manner. The absolute power hierarchies which were enforced by colonial diktat have been replaced by an international order based on ‘common but differentiated’ responsibilities, in which states are sovereign equals on the surface but unequal in their actual operation of power.?Although the United States and its allies refer to this international system as a ‘rules-based’ order where every nation is bound to observe the same rules, in fact, it revolves around the West rather than the UN and international law.

Post-war US hegemony is the modern incarnation of the global centre-periphery order. The international Group of Seven (G7), established in the 1970s, holds annual meetings at which Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States discuss not only the affairs of these seven countries, but also global issues for which they negotiate and determine international rules. The so-called rules-based order is indeed an order based on the rules made by Western countries and their allies. What matters here is who makes the rules. In this global system, the division of labour, money supply, industrial production, and rulemaking are the exclusive purview of a select few countries. The advantageous position of these countries would be broken up if other countries attempted to join their club, disrupting the rulemaking authority, monetary dominance, and technological superiority maintained through the intellectual property rights regime. China’s unexpected economic rise in recent decades has broken precisely this post-war centre-periphery world order, threatening the structural privileges of the Western countries, which had never imagined that China could enter the centre of the global stage (even if China is only approaching this position and has not yet arrived). As a result, the United States has labelled China as its ‘strategic competitor’ in recent years and demonstrated its willingness to use any means to halt China’s development.

Both NATO’s eastward expansion and Washington’s attempt to contain China suggest that the US and Western countries only seek to maintain and reinforce their own positions of power in the world order. The Russia-Ukraine conflict and the comprehensive Western sanctions against Russia have further underscored the truth about the global system: the majority of the world find themselves in the ‘countryside’ of the global periphery whereas only a select few countries sit in the ‘cities’ of the global centre, at the core of which is the United States. These countries do not wish to see the ‘countryside’ turn into ‘cities’, as they are. China and Russia hinder the global ‘city centre’ in two key aspects: on the one hand, due to their strong capacity to control capital, the two countries are the largest remaining territories in the world that have not been subject to the arbitrary domination of capitalist globalisation; on the other hand, their national strength is much greater than most countries and impedes efforts of the ‘city centre’ to further control the ‘countryside’ of the global periphery. During this wave of globalisation, China has departed from the ‘countryside’ for the ‘city’ with its strong economic growth and overall growth in national strength. The countries at the centre, despite their earlier enthusiastic praise for globalisation, are now leading ‘deglobalisation’ efforts, exposing the limits of the universality of the post-war international order. China and the other nations of the ‘countryside’ joining the ‘cities’ is simply intolerable to the central countries.

The Base of Support for Multilateralism Is in the Global South

Since the 1980s, China has pursued reform and opening up and promoted international cooperation, including, over the last decade, advancing a proposal for the building of ‘a(chǎn) community with a shared future for humanity’ (人類(lèi)命運(yùn)共同體, rénlèi mìngyùn gòngtóngtǐ). These efforts can be traced back to the ancient Chinese idea of ‘the great unity under heaven’ (天下大同, tiānxià dàtóng); however, this ‘great unity’ cannot be achieved by China’s desire alone. In the current context of all-out hostility from the US-led West towards Russia and China, the world can no longer be viewed in a mechanical manner and simply assumed to be united around peace and development. Instead, it is necessary to seriously consider the threats of competition, conflict, and war; even if war is excluded from the likely outcomes, it is clear that it is no longer possible for China to continue to pursue its path of development in the Western-dominated system of globalisation. As such, China must reassess its answer to the primary question in foreign relations: which countries are potential partners for China, now and in the future, and which countries will China find it difficult to establish or maintain partnerships with?

As a well-known Chinese idiom goes, similar things group together and similar people fit together (or, birds of a feather flock together). The same applies to nations; those nations which share similar experiences, contexts, and challenges are more likely to form an enduring cooperative relationship. Since the nineteenth century, the world has undergone a global transformation driven by three key components, industrialisation, rational state-building, and ideologies of progress, shifting from a polycentric world with no dominant centre to a highly interlinked and hierarchical core-periphery order in which the centre of gravity resided in the West.?Between the mid-to-late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, imperialism and globalisation were two sides of the same coin: imperialism has driven globalisation while globalisation reinforced imperialism. Together, these related processes have trapped the peripheral nations of the world in a prison of underdevelopment, from which it is extremely difficult to break free. The West, as the former centre of the international system and the birthplace of imperialism, produced both the modern colonial order as well as the system of US hegemony that has dominated the world since the mid-to-late twentieth century. Meanwhile, many revolutionary movements, namely the anti-colonial struggles of the past century, have fought to overcome the inequality and injustice of this global centre-periphery power structure.

In this unequal world order, the central countries do not fairly welcome peripheral countries to the centre and oppose revolutions in the periphery. Consequently, to liberate themselves from subordination and exploitation, peripheral countries have to work together and, occasionally, exploit the rifts between those states at the centre, tactically cooperating with central states when it can advance the struggle. Over the past century, during the Chinese Revolution and the consolidation of state power, the main external forces that China depended on for support came from the global periphery. In the first half of the twentieth century, the Communist Party of China (CPC) was a member of the Communist International, an alliance of state and nonstate actors among the colonised and oppressed peoples of the world. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1931–45), China joined the World Anti-Fascist War, upheld the anti-imperialist banner, and furthered the struggle to dismantle the unequal global structures created by imperialist states. After the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, China placed a great deal of emphasis on cooperation with the countries of the Third World and supported the anti-colonial movements and post-independence development across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Of particular importance was China’s active participation in the Bandung Conference of 1955 – an important step in the eventual creation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 – where its proposal of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (和平共處五項(xiàng)原則, hépíng gòngchǔ wǔ xiàng yuánzé) for international relations was well received; the conference became a milestone in China’s relations with the Global South, where cooperation and solidarity gained positive momentum.?It was with the support of peripheral countries that the PRC regained its rightful seat in the United Nations in 1971 and became a permanent member of the Security Council.

The mutual solidarity and support between China and the countries of Asia Africa, and Latin America has remained a key feature of China’s approach to international relations, which emphasises multilateral cooperation with developing countries of the Global South to defend national sovereignty and development in a joint struggle against the unequal and unjust international order structured by the central countries. Despite focusing on relations with peripheral countries, under the framework of ‘omnidirectional diplomacy’ (全方位外交, quán fāngwèi wàijiāo), China remains open to engaging and developing friendly cooperation with Western developed countries and other major powers. However, it should be noted that, in the past, the interaction and cooperation between China and the countries at the centre always bore two preconditions: on the one hand, China insisted on developing foreign relations premised on independence, equality, and mutual benefit, and opposed the existing power hierarchies in international relations; on the other hand, the central countries placed a ceiling on their collaboration with China, namely, the position of Western countries at the centre of the global power structure could not be altered. Whenever either of these two preconditions were not met, China, as a member of the developing world, faced serious challenges in deepening its cooperation with the Western countries, especially on political matters.

Adjusting the Geographic Priorities of China’s Foreign Relations

Over the last forty years, setting aside ideological differences and institutional disparities between countries, China has sought to work with all the other nations. Gradually, China’s international relations came to be guided by the following logic: the major powers are the key; surrounding areas are the first priority; developing countries are the foundations; and multilateral forums are the important stage. However, as the current era of globalisation comes to an end, this approach has increasingly encountered obstacles. The US-initiated process of decoupling from China in terms of economic, technological, knowledge, and people-to-people exchanges – a process that Washington has coerced other Western countries into joining – is unlikely to be reversed and instead, due to the Russia-Ukraine war, it could intensify even further.

Since its founding in 1949, the PRC has undergone several significant shifts in its foreign policy direction, all of which occurred in response to specific historical situations; from the advocacy of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the early years of the PRC, to the Three Worlds Theory proposed amid the normalisation of the China-US relations in the 1970s, to the emphasis on developing partnerships with Western countries as part of the transition to reform and opening up after 1978. The contemporary situation is defined by, what China’s President Xi Jinping has called, ‘major changes unseen in a century’ (百年未有之大變局, bǎinián wèi yǒu zhī dà biànjú) and the increasing tendency of Western states to suppress challenges to their authority. Especially in the period since war broke out between Russia and Ukraine, Western states have revealed their willingness to gang up on, pressure, and contain developing countries, a feature of the current Western-dominated order that will undermine international relations for some time. China cannot help but be highly alarmed by the punitive measures that the West has imposed on Russia, as they could also be imposed on China in a similar manner in the future. For this reason, it is urgently necessary that China re-examines its multilateralist tradition and re-orients the geographic configuration of its foreign relations, strengthening its partnerships with developing countries of the Global South to foster a new international environment that is conducive to China’s national security and long-term development.

In 1974, Mao Zedong set forth his Three Worlds Theory, which categorised the countries of the world into three major groupings, each necessitating a distinct approach to engagement from China. The third grouping, the developing countries of the Third World, were the main focus of China, which itself was also part of the Third World; the Chinese government and people firmly supported the just struggles of all the oppressed peoples and nations. Drawing on China’s previous practices and experiences in foreign relations, the theory outlined spatial priorities for China’s ties with other countries and provided an important ideological guide to the country’s approach to South-South cooperation. This theory remains highly relevant and should guide the present-day reconfiguration of the spatial priorities of China’s foreign relations. Contrary to the emphasis placed on working with Western countries since reform and opening up began four decades ago, China now needs to foreground the advancement of the South-South project.

Whether it concerns diplomatic affairs, long-term development, or national rejuvenation, for a considerable period of time, China’s foreign strategic arrangements will have to prioritise engaging with countries of the Global South. China should configure its foreign relations and promote the construction of a new global order under the ‘three-ring’ (三環(huán), sān huán) framework. The first ring refers to China’s neighbouring regions of East Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, which present important resource, energy, and security considerations; the second ring refers to the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, with which China engages in trade, investment, and infrastructure projects, and to which China mainly delivers its foreign aid; finally, the third ring refers to the United States, European countries, and other industrialised countries with which China exchanges industrial products, technologies, and knowledge.

Within the new ‘three ring’ framework, China’s first and foremost priority in helping to build a new international system should be the first ring, namely East Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. To further promote East Asian economic integration and linkages with Central Asia and the Middle East, it is necessary to strengthen engagement and cooperation between Asian countries.. In recent years, by promoting economic diplomacy, China has made considerable progress in advancing East Asian economic integration and economic cooperation with many Asian countries. The latest breakthrough in East Asian economic integration was realised on 1 January 2022, when, after years of negotiation, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) finally entered into force. However, economic exchanges among East Asian countries have been increasingly affected by extra-regional forces and security issues in recent years, with disputes over maritime rights in the South China Sea and Washington’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategy fuelling uncertainty in the region. To prevent external forces from exploiting internal problems in Asia, China should move away from the ‘GDP supremacy’, or a narrow focus on economic matters, which it prioritised previously in its foreign relations, and pay greater attention to political and security agendas in the region, promotinge more security cooperation among Asian countries.

South-South Cooperation is the Material Basis of the New ‘Three Rings’

The material basis for the new ‘three rings’ framework is South-South cooperation, a concept that emerged in the late twentieth century regarding mutual interests, support, and solidarity among Third World countries.?In the twenty-first century, a new foundation for South-South cooperation is being laid, making the concept more achievable in reality. The main reason for this is that, in recent decades, a number of developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have been able to industrialise or quasi-industrialise by ‘climbing up the borrowed ladder’, seizing the opportunities afforded by the wave of globalisation. Among these countries, a new global system of material production and circulation has taken shape, and is on track to eclipse the original ‘ladder’ of globalisation built by Western countries. This new global system has manifested in two important respects.

First, the share of developing countries in the global economy has changed significantly. In 1980, developed countries accounted for 75.4 percent of global GDP while developing countries accounted for less than 25 percent; however, by 2021, the former group’s share of global GDP had fallen to 57.8 percent while the latter’s share rose to 42.2 percent.?The combined GDP of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) plus Turkey, South Korea, and Indonesia, in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, jumped from 21 percent of the global economy in 1992 to 37.7 percent in 2021, while the combined share of G7 countries declined from 45.8 percent to 30.7 percent in the same period.

Second, trade and reciprocal investment between developing countries have also become pivotal. From 1997 to 2010, trade between China and African states increased 22.4 times and trade with Latin American states increased roughly 22 times; and from 2010 to 2021, China-Africa and China-Latin America trade increased another 2 times and 2.5 times respectively.?From 2000 to 2018, trade between China and Arab states ballooned from $15.2 billion to $244.3 billion, a 16-fold increase in less than twenty years.?Other emerging economies, such as Brazil and India, have sharply increased their trade with developing countries. From 2003 to 2010, Brazil’s trade with Arab states increased four-fold, while its trade with African states increased five-fold, reaching a total of $26 billion, a figure higher than Brazil’s trade with traditional trading partners such as Germany and Japan; and from 2010 to 2019, Brazil’s trade with Arab and African states increased by 98 percent and 68 percent, respectively.?Similarly, since 2001, India’s trade with African states has grown at an average annual rate of 17.2 percent and, from 2011 to 2021, it increased 2.26 times.?India’s trade with Latin American states as well as the Middle East and North Africa region, has experienced similar growth. Trade volumes between developing countries are growing at a faster rate than the global average, while trading with developed countries continues to decline.

Within the developing world, a particularly important network of economic cooperation has emerged in Asia, centring around China. This is demonstrated in the following four trends:

1. Asia is once again the world economy’s centre of gravity. In 1980, the developing countries of Asia accounted for only 13.7 percent of global GDP, however, their share would rise to 24.7 percent in 2010 and reach 35.8 percent in 2021.?For East Asian countries (including China, Japan, South Korea, and ten Southeast Asian countries), in 1980 their share of global GDP was only about 16.2 percent, but by 2020 it had more than doubled, reaching 30 percent.?Meanwhile, among the fifteen member countries of the RCEP, by 2020, their combined population reached 2.27 billion, cumulative GDP hit $26 trillion, and total imports and exports surpassed $10 trillion, accounting for about 30 percent of the global total.?According to HSBC, the cumulative size of the RCEP economies is estimated to expand to 50 percent of the world economy by 2030.
2. Global trade and investment are also shifting to Asia, with its share in global trade having steadily increased from 15.7 percent in 1980, to 22.2 percent in 1990, to 27.3 percent in 1995, to 26.7 percent in 2000, to 25.6 percent in 2001, and further to 36 percent by 2020. Today, Asia is the world’s leading trading region.
3. The level of intra-regional trade dwarfs that of extra-regional trade in Asia. Between 2001 and 2020, Asia’s total internal trade jumped from $3.2 trillion to $12.7 trillion, with an average annual nominal growth rate of 7.5 percent; during the same period, Asia’s share of total world trade increased from 25.6 percent to 36.0 percent.?In 2020, Asia’s intra-regional trade has accounted for nearly 58.5 percent of its entire foreign trade.
4. East and West Asia are growing closer economically; the main destinations of Middle Eastern energy have shifted from the United States and Europe to East and South Asia.

Today, developing countries have formed the preliminary structure for a new global economic system, but further synergy between them is needed to achieve a higher degree of economic connectivity as well as greater political influence in the international arena and freedom from Western control and coercion. This past decade, China has become the world’s largest real economy (concerning the production and exchange of goods and services) and the second largest economy overall, as well as the largest trading partner of most countries in the world. In 2021, the global share of China’s manufacturing sector was nearly 30 percent. As the country that produces the most material goods in the world, China is in a similar position as the United States was in the post-Second World War period (at its peak, in 1953, the US accounted for roughly 28 percent of global industrial output). What China can and should do is to take initiative in driving a global strategy to improve the system of global material exchange among developing countries, that is, to truly realise South-South cooperation.

However, deficiencies still remain. Current trade and investment between developing countries still rely heavily on Western-led financial and monetary networks. If developing countries are to further enhance their economic and political autonomy, and if emerging economies are to gain levels of political influence in the world system commensurate with their economic scales, they must overcome their financial and monetary dependence on the West. Therefore, to build a ‘new three ring’ international system, developing countries must consider not only traditional geopolitical factors, but also the global systems of finance and information. In recent years, China has explored this by developing currency swaps with several emerging market economies. A higher-level and broader mechanism for financial and monetary cooperation should be created among developing countries. To this end, it is important to take advantage of existing platforms and mechanisms that can enhance South-South cooperation, including: upgrading and transforming the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB) established by the BRICS countries to advance an autonomous international payment system; strengthening security and financial cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), particularly between China, Russia, India, and Iran cooperation (it should be noted that Russia is also a developing country and that the Chinese and Russian economies are highly complementary); further promoting East Asian economic integration under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with special efforts to consolidate the achievements of the RCEP; building a common energy market in Asia, so that buyers in East and South Asia and sellers in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Russia can share the same energy trading and payment network; making proper use of the BRICS Summit mechanism, thus deepening South-South cooperation; and promoting the diversification of the international monetary system and the internationalisation of the RMB in the context of South-South cooperation, as well as supporting the international status of the euro while hedging against the hegemony of the US dollar.

One hundred years ago, the CPC leaders proposed the revolutionary strategy of ‘encircling the cities from the rural areas’ (農(nóng)村包圍城市, nóngcūn bāoweí chéngshì). In the present era of ‘major changes unseen in a century’, China and developing countries need to dismantle the centre-periphery world order, overcome the hostility of Western countries, and improve solidarity and cooperation within the global ‘countryside’. The deepening of South-South cooperation will create favourable conditions and mobilise resources for the construction of a new ‘three ring’ global system, which can ease international tensions and allow developing countries, including China, to take their rightful places at the centre of the world economic and political order. After more than forty years of reform and opening up, China must adjust its understanding of ‘opening up’ and transform its thinking about foreign relations. Of course, China should still try to maintain its cooperation with the West as long as possible and as long as they do not make the choice to go completely against China.

構(gòu)建“新三環(huán)”：面對(duì)全面脫鉤可能的中國(guó)選擇

俄羅斯對(duì)烏克蘭發(fā)起“特別軍事行動(dòng)”，以及隨之而來(lái)的西方國(guó)家與俄羅斯陷入全面對(duì)立，是20世紀(jì)80年代以來(lái)的全球化大潮走向終結(jié)的一起標(biāo)志性事件。美國(guó)挾持盟友對(duì)俄羅斯展開(kāi)欲置之于死地的制裁，威逼世界其他國(guó)家在西方國(guó)家與俄羅斯之間選邊站隊(duì)，已使世界正在重現(xiàn)百年前你死我活的爭(zhēng)斗場(chǎng)景，也給中國(guó)帶來(lái)巨大挑戰(zhàn)。“全球化終結(jié)”使中國(guó)不再擁有過(guò)去四十年來(lái)的外部發(fā)展環(huán)境可資利用，美國(guó)推動(dòng)重建以其為主導(dǎo)的國(guó)際體系并與中國(guó)和俄羅斯“脫鉤”的進(jìn)程，未來(lái)極有可能進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)化。當(dāng)今世界的時(shí)代特征，已發(fā)生范式性變革。面對(duì)被動(dòng)全面脫鉤的可能情況，中國(guó)需要在對(duì)外戰(zhàn)略安排上主動(dòng)做出調(diào)整，在國(guó)家交往優(yōu)先性上重新做出選擇，以塑造有利于對(duì)沖西方國(guó)家對(duì)華脫鉤負(fù)面影響的新型國(guó)際體系。

▍國(guó)際秩序的潛規(guī)則是中心-邊緣權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)

蘇聯(lián)解體后三十年間，俄羅斯由起初積極向美國(guó)和西方國(guó)家靠攏，到逐漸與之疏離，以至當(dāng)前不惜激烈對(duì)抗，凸顯出全球化的政治限度。與人們對(duì)全球化的浪漫想象不同，最新一輪的全球化最初是美國(guó)霸權(quán)的投資品，部分服務(wù)于瓦解蘇聯(lián)和社會(huì)主義陣營(yíng)的目的，這決定了它不可能無(wú)限擴(kuò)展。從全球化的主導(dǎo)型國(guó)家與跟隨型國(guó)家，或發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家與發(fā)展中國(guó)家的關(guān)系來(lái)說(shuō)，則存在著國(guó)際政治的平等限度：當(dāng)全球化對(duì)發(fā)起者發(fā)生反噬，威脅到其權(quán)力優(yōu)勢(shì)時(shí)，全球化必然會(huì)發(fā)生“逆轉(zhuǎn)”，運(yùn)行路徑會(huì)被重新設(shè)計(jì)。最近幾十年來(lái)的全球化進(jìn)程與美國(guó)的權(quán)力優(yōu)勢(shì)追求是一枚硬幣的正反面，二者互為條件、彼此共進(jìn)。俄羅斯對(duì)烏克蘭發(fā)動(dòng)“特別軍事行動(dòng)”，是這一輪全球化已經(jīng)完全暴露其權(quán)力本相的結(jié)果，也給由美國(guó)主導(dǎo)的全球化畫(huà)上了句號(hào)。

北約東擴(kuò)是俄羅斯主動(dòng)出擊的主要理由。這看起來(lái)是個(gè)安全問(wèn)題，其實(shí)也是全球化進(jìn)程中的經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題。將蘇聯(lián)在全球體系中外圍化，是美國(guó)發(fā)起的全球化進(jìn)程的目標(biāo)，俄羅斯意欲借助全球化實(shí)現(xiàn)國(guó)家復(fù)興、成為中心地帶國(guó)家，顯然與其發(fā)生和演進(jìn)邏輯正相違背。全球資本特別是金融資本對(duì)俄羅斯的興趣，更多集中在能源、糧食和礦產(chǎn)等方面，這是金融資本可以從中謀取巨利的領(lǐng)域。但普京執(zhí)政以來(lái)，俄羅斯加強(qiáng)了對(duì)關(guān)乎國(guó)家安全和基本民生的關(guān)鍵產(chǎn)業(yè)的控制，并致力于構(gòu)建歐亞經(jīng)濟(jì)聯(lián)盟，塑造一個(gè)適合于自己的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展空間，這是外部資本不樂(lè)見(jiàn)的。北約東擴(kuò)正是資本左右政治實(shí)現(xiàn)市場(chǎng)擴(kuò)張的體現(xiàn)，其不斷擠壓俄羅斯的發(fā)展空間，加劇俄羅斯的外圍化，如不能做出有效應(yīng)對(duì)，俄羅斯將被進(jìn)一步定格在初級(jí)產(chǎn)品提供者的位置，喪失參與大國(guó)政治的能力，甚至出現(xiàn)內(nèi)政危機(jī)。這是俄羅斯精英階層不愿看到的。

北約東擴(kuò)以及當(dāng)前西方國(guó)家抱團(tuán)對(duì)俄羅斯瘋狂制裁，已將當(dāng)代世界的權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)顯露無(wú)遺。“二戰(zhàn)”結(jié)束以后，歐洲殖民體系逐漸瓦解，20世紀(jì)下半葉以來(lái)國(guó)際秩序的明規(guī)則，是以聯(lián)合國(guó)和國(guó)際法為中心，體現(xiàn)的是國(guó)家主權(quán)平等原則。但歐洲殖民體系下的中心-邊緣等級(jí)性國(guó)際秩序并沒(méi)有真的消失，而是作為潛規(guī)則和隱秩序一直延續(xù)至今，只是以往以直接驅(qū)使為特征的絕對(duì)等級(jí)性權(quán)力關(guān)系已不復(fù)存在，代之以“共同而有差別”的國(guó)際秩序，即所有國(guó)家在明面上主權(quán)一律平等，但在實(shí)際運(yùn)行上仍存在著權(quán)力差別?！耙砸?guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的秩序”是這種秩序的主要表達(dá)，所有的國(guó)家都需要遵守相同的規(guī)則，但這個(gè)規(guī)則的真實(shí)內(nèi)涵，并不是以聯(lián)合國(guó)和國(guó)際法為中心，而是以西方國(guó)家為中心。

戰(zhàn)后以來(lái)的美國(guó)霸權(quán)和20世紀(jì)70年代后建立起來(lái)的七國(guó)集團(tuán)，是當(dāng)代版本的全球性中心-邊緣秩序的主要體現(xiàn)，七國(guó)集團(tuán)每年的年會(huì)，討論的不僅僅是七個(gè)國(guó)家的事情，也是整個(gè)世界的事情，它們商議好了再推動(dòng)轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槿蛞?guī)則。“以規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的秩序”，其實(shí)是“以西方國(guó)家制定的規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的秩序”，誰(shuí)是規(guī)則制定者，才是關(guān)鍵所在。在全球性的分工體系中，規(guī)則制定、貨幣供給和工業(yè)品生產(chǎn)，是少數(shù)處于中心地帶的國(guó)家的事情，其他國(guó)家如果也想加入其中，就有可能瓦解少數(shù)國(guó)家的優(yōu)勢(shì)地位，這是掌握規(guī)則制定權(quán)和貨幣主導(dǎo)權(quán)，并以知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)維持技術(shù)優(yōu)勢(shì)的國(guó)家不愿意看到的。中國(guó)在最近幾十年來(lái)出人意料的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)，所打破的正是戰(zhàn)后以來(lái)的中心-邊緣國(guó)際秩序，威脅到了以西方國(guó)家為中心的潛規(guī)則，近些年來(lái)美國(guó)將中國(guó)定義為主要“戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手”，擺出一副不將中國(guó)打垮不罷休的架勢(shì)，主要原因就是中國(guó)的發(fā)展已經(jīng)觸動(dòng)美國(guó)和其他西方國(guó)家的奶酪，后者從沒(méi)有設(shè)想過(guò)中國(guó)也可以“走進(jìn)世界舞臺(tái)中央”，哪怕目前其實(shí)只是“走近”。

無(wú)論是北約東擴(kuò)還是美國(guó)將中國(guó)選定為重點(diǎn)打壓對(duì)象，都反映出美國(guó)和西方國(guó)家想要維持和強(qiáng)化的是自身的權(quán)力優(yōu)勢(shì)。俄烏沖突以及西方國(guó)家對(duì)俄無(wú)所不用其極的制裁措施進(jìn)一步凸顯的實(shí)相，是全球大多數(shù)國(guó)家處在邊緣地帶的“農(nóng)村”，少數(shù)國(guó)家處在中心地帶的“城市”，美國(guó)又是全球“城市中心”中的“市中心”，“城市”并不想看到“農(nóng)村”也像它們一樣變成“城市”。中國(guó)和俄羅斯對(duì)全球“城市中心”的妨礙，既在于兩國(guó)對(duì)資本的強(qiáng)管控能力，成為資本主義全球化最后兩塊最大的未自由支配之地；也在于兩國(guó)因其相較大多數(shù)國(guó)家強(qiáng)大得多的國(guó)家實(shí)力，而成為“城市中心”進(jìn)一步控制全球“農(nóng)村”邊緣地帶的障礙。在這一輪全球化進(jìn)程中，中國(guó)以其強(qiáng)勁的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)和國(guó)家實(shí)力的全面提升，表現(xiàn)出由“農(nóng)村”向“城市”進(jìn)發(fā)的趨勢(shì)，中心地帶國(guó)家一反早期對(duì)全球化的溢美，轉(zhuǎn)而在近年來(lái)成為“逆全球化”的引領(lǐng)者，這將戰(zhàn)后國(guó)際秩序的“共同”限度暴露無(wú)遺。中國(guó)也成為“城市”中的一員，是中心地帶國(guó)家所無(wú)法容忍的。

▍中國(guó)開(kāi)展多邊合作的基本盤(pán)在非西方國(guó)家

在《毛澤東選集》的首篇《中國(guó)社會(huì)各階級(jí)的分析》中，開(kāi)篇提出一個(gè)問(wèn)題：“誰(shuí)是我們的敵人？誰(shuí)是我們的朋友？這個(gè)問(wèn)題是革命的首要問(wèn)題?！敝袊?guó)過(guò)去四十多年來(lái)進(jìn)行改革開(kāi)放，以及近幾年來(lái)倡議建設(shè)人類(lèi)命運(yùn)共同體，在國(guó)際交往中已不再刻意強(qiáng)調(diào)敵友之分，而是希望在“各美其美，美人之美”中推進(jìn)“美美與共，天下大同”。但天下能否達(dá)成“大同”，并不由中國(guó)一家的愿望決定。在以美國(guó)為首的西方國(guó)家與俄羅斯、中國(guó)展現(xiàn)出全面對(duì)抗態(tài)勢(shì)的情況下，當(dāng)代世界的時(shí)代特征，已不能機(jī)械地認(rèn)為還是“和平與發(fā)展”，而需要嚴(yán)肅地考慮“競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”甚至“戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)”——即便戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的情況可以排除，想一如既往地在由西方國(guó)家主導(dǎo)的全球化體系中實(shí)現(xiàn)更好的發(fā)展，已經(jīng)沒(méi)有可能。中國(guó)不得不重新思考對(duì)外往來(lái)中的“首要問(wèn)題”：誰(shuí)是當(dāng)下和未來(lái)中國(guó)的可能合作者，誰(shuí)是中國(guó)無(wú)法拉住的合作對(duì)象？

物以類(lèi)聚，人以群分。國(guó)家也是一樣，有著相似經(jīng)歷、處境和訴求的國(guó)家，更有可能形成長(zhǎng)久合作關(guān)系。在當(dāng)代國(guó)際關(guān)系話語(yǔ)體系中，西方國(guó)家vs非西方國(guó)家、發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家vs發(fā)展中國(guó)家、北方國(guó)家vs南方國(guó)家是對(duì)國(guó)家類(lèi)型的常見(jiàn)區(qū)分，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家、北方國(guó)家大多是西方國(guó)家，南方國(guó)家、發(fā)展中國(guó)家都是非西方國(guó)家。與發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家vs發(fā)展中國(guó)家、北方國(guó)家vs南方國(guó)家的區(qū)分偏向經(jīng)濟(jì)層面不同，西方國(guó)家vs非西方國(guó)家的區(qū)分還指向政治和文化層面，暗含了全球權(quán)力關(guān)系。19世紀(jì)以來(lái)，在工業(yè)化、理性國(guó)家建設(shè)和“進(jìn)步的意識(shí)形態(tài)”三個(gè)關(guān)鍵要素的作用下，世界經(jīng)歷了一次“全球轉(zhuǎn)型”(Global Transformation)：以往處于離散狀態(tài)的“無(wú)中心的多元世界”，轉(zhuǎn)向了一個(gè)高度關(guān)聯(lián)而又等級(jí)化的“中心-邊緣”全球性國(guó)際體系，西方是這一秩序的中心。19世紀(jì)后期到20世紀(jì)上半葉的革命時(shí)代，被頻繁談?wù)摰摹暗蹏?guó)主義”，就是對(duì)這種秩序關(guān)系的描述和定性。帝國(guó)主義與19世紀(jì)中后期到20世紀(jì)前期的全球化，乃是一體兩面，帝國(guó)主義隨全球化而來(lái)，全球化則強(qiáng)化了帝國(guó)主義，二者共同給處于邊緣地帶的國(guó)家設(shè)置了一個(gè)“鐵桶陣”，想從中逸出，殊為不易。西方國(guó)家以往是全球體系的中心，也是帝國(guó)主義的發(fā)生地，近代世界的殖民秩序、20世紀(jì)中下葉以來(lái)的美國(guó)霸權(quán)，都由此而來(lái)；與此同時(shí)，近代以來(lái)的諸多革命，包括20世紀(jì)中下葉的反殖民運(yùn)動(dòng)，要打破的，就是這種不平等不公正的中心-邊緣權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)。

在中心-邊緣的全球權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)中，中心地帶國(guó)家不可能真心幫助邊緣地帶國(guó)家的革命，也不會(huì)歡迎邊緣地帶國(guó)家以平等的方式加入到中心地帶國(guó)家之列，邊緣地帶國(guó)家欲擺脫被支配、被剝奪的命運(yùn)，只能依靠邊緣地帶國(guó)家間的抱團(tuán)取暖，在偶然情況下也要利用中心地帶國(guó)家間的罅隙，爭(zhēng)取與后者實(shí)現(xiàn)斗爭(zhēng)中的合作。20世紀(jì)上半葉的中國(guó)革命和20世紀(jì)下半葉的政權(quán)鞏固，中國(guó)所依靠的主要外部力量，正是來(lái)自全球體系中的邊緣地帶。中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨曾經(jīng)參與的共產(chǎn)國(guó)際網(wǎng)絡(luò)，是當(dāng)時(shí)被殖民被壓迫民族的非政權(quán)性力量間的同盟；在抗日戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中，中國(guó)借參與世界反法西斯戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)之機(jī)，延續(xù)之前中國(guó)革命的“反帝”訴求，進(jìn)一步推動(dòng)廢除帝國(guó)主義國(guó)家強(qiáng)加于中國(guó)頭上的各種不平等權(quán)利；1949年中華人民共和國(guó)成立后，中國(guó)高度重視與“第三世界”國(guó)家的合作，支持亞非拉世界的反殖民運(yùn)動(dòng)和獨(dú)立后的國(guó)家建設(shè)，尤其是1955年積極參與萬(wàn)隆會(huì)議和提出和平共處五項(xiàng)原則，得到亞非拉國(guó)家的良好呼應(yīng)，也成為此后中國(guó)與亞非拉國(guó)家關(guān)系進(jìn)入良性循環(huán)的重要節(jié)點(diǎn)，在后者的支持配合下，中國(guó)于1971年重返聯(lián)合國(guó)并成為安理會(huì)常任理事國(guó)。

中國(guó)與亞非拉國(guó)家在反抗殖民統(tǒng)治和國(guó)家建設(shè)中的相互聲援、幫助，奠定了近代以來(lái)中國(guó)多邊主義的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵特點(diǎn)，即高度重視與非西方發(fā)展中國(guó)家的合作，在共同反抗中心國(guó)家構(gòu)建的不平等不公正國(guó)際秩序中捍衛(wèi)國(guó)家獨(dú)立自主和發(fā)展進(jìn)步。在以非西方發(fā)展中國(guó)家為依托所展開(kāi)的全方位外交中，中國(guó)并不排斥與西方發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和其他大國(guó)的往來(lái)甚至發(fā)展友好合作關(guān)系。但也要看到，中國(guó)以往與中心地帶國(guó)家的交往和合作始終有兩個(gè)前提：一是從中國(guó)的角度來(lái)論，中國(guó)堅(jiān)持在獨(dú)立自主、平等互惠的前提下發(fā)展對(duì)外關(guān)系，反對(duì)國(guó)際關(guān)系中的權(quán)力等級(jí)；二是從中心地帶國(guó)家來(lái)論，它們與中國(guó)合作，始終也有一個(gè)天花板，那就是不能動(dòng)搖以西方國(guó)家為中心的全球權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)。當(dāng)這兩個(gè)前提中的任何一個(gè)發(fā)生改變時(shí)，作為發(fā)展中國(guó)家一員的中國(guó)，就很難繼續(xù)與西方國(guó)家深入發(fā)展合作關(guān)系，尤其是政治上的合作關(guān)系。

過(guò)去四十年間，中國(guó)放棄意識(shí)形態(tài)歧異、回避?chē)?guó)家制度差別，致力于與所有國(guó)家開(kāi)展合作，逐步形成了“大國(guó)是關(guān)鍵、周邊是首要、發(fā)展中國(guó)家是基礎(chǔ)、多邊是重要舞臺(tái)”的對(duì)外交往格局。但這一格局在“全球化終結(jié)”時(shí)刻到來(lái)之際，已遭遇重重障礙。美國(guó)裹挾其他西方國(guó)家發(fā)起的與中國(guó)在經(jīng)濟(jì)、技術(shù)、知識(shí)、人員往來(lái)等方面的“脫鉤”，不太可能因俄烏戰(zhàn)火而撤回，相反可能變本加厲。

中華人民共和國(guó)成立以來(lái)，已經(jīng)歷多次外交方向的轉(zhuǎn)變，從剛建國(guó)時(shí)的“一邊倒”，到20世紀(jì)70年代的“一條線，一大片”和“三個(gè)世界”劃分，再到1978年后轉(zhuǎn)向改革開(kāi)放、重點(diǎn)發(fā)展與西方國(guó)家的合作，都因應(yīng)了當(dāng)時(shí)情勢(shì)。在當(dāng)前“百來(lái)未有之大變局”之際，西方國(guó)家表現(xiàn)出越來(lái)越強(qiáng)的打壓潛在挑戰(zhàn)者的意向，特別是俄烏戰(zhàn)火爆發(fā)后，西方國(guó)家群體集結(jié)、全方面壓制非西方國(guó)家的態(tài)勢(shì)暴露無(wú)遺，并將成為未來(lái)較長(zhǎng)時(shí)間內(nèi)國(guó)際關(guān)系的結(jié)構(gòu)性存在。中國(guó)不能不高度警惕西方國(guó)家對(duì)俄羅斯無(wú)所不用其極的制裁打壓手段未來(lái)會(huì)如法炮制施加于中國(guó)。為此，重新審視中國(guó)以往的多邊主義傳統(tǒng)，調(diào)整對(duì)外交往的空間格局，加強(qiáng)與非西方發(fā)展中國(guó)家的合作，以創(chuàng)造有利于保障中國(guó)國(guó)家安全和長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展的新型國(guó)際環(huán)境，迫在眉睫。

1974年毛澤東提出“三個(gè)世界”的劃分，對(duì)當(dāng)時(shí)世界的三種類(lèi)型國(guó)家及中國(guó)可以與之交往的方式做了辨析，“第三世界”的發(fā)展中國(guó)家是中國(guó)的主要交往對(duì)象，中國(guó)自身也是“第三世界”國(guó)家中的一員，中國(guó)政府和人民堅(jiān)決支持一切被壓迫人民和被壓迫民族的正義斗爭(zhēng)。“三個(gè)世界”理論承接了之前的中國(guó)對(duì)外交往經(jīng)驗(yàn)，為當(dāng)時(shí)中國(guó)的對(duì)外往來(lái)在空間優(yōu)先性上作了排序，也是中國(guó)以往參與南南合作的重要思想指導(dǎo)，它對(duì)當(dāng)前中國(guó)重構(gòu)對(duì)外往來(lái)的空間優(yōu)先性，依然有很強(qiáng)的啟發(fā)意義。相比于改革開(kāi)放以來(lái)中國(guó)更加重視與西方國(guó)家的合作，中國(guó)今后要將推動(dòng)南南合作放在突出位置。無(wú)論是尋求外交突圍、長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展還是國(guó)家復(fù)興，在未來(lái)相當(dāng)長(zhǎng)時(shí)間內(nèi)，中國(guó)的對(duì)外戰(zhàn)略安排都要把主要精力放到推動(dòng)建設(shè)以亞洲及其周?chē)貐^(qū)為依托的新的全球性體系。其最終結(jié)果，是要形成保障中國(guó)國(guó)家安全和發(fā)展的“三環(huán)”國(guó)際體系：第一環(huán)是中國(guó)周邊的東亞、中亞和中東，東亞連接世界財(cái)源，中國(guó)與此區(qū)域內(nèi)國(guó)家已形成緊密產(chǎn)業(yè)分工體系，中亞和中東連接世界資源，中國(guó)要背靠此區(qū)域內(nèi)國(guó)家獲得穩(wěn)定的能源供應(yīng)和可靠的安全屏障；第二環(huán)是亞非拉廣大發(fā)展中國(guó)家，中國(guó)與之進(jìn)行原材料和工業(yè)品交換，中國(guó)的對(duì)外援助也應(yīng)主要面向這些國(guó)家；第三環(huán)則擴(kuò)展到以歐洲和美國(guó)為主的傳統(tǒng)工業(yè)化國(guó)家，中國(guó)與之進(jìn)行工業(yè)品、技術(shù)和知識(shí)交換。以這“三環(huán)”結(jié)構(gòu)來(lái)安排對(duì)外往來(lái)的輕重緩急和前后左右，重新規(guī)劃對(duì)外交往的方向和內(nèi)容。

構(gòu)建“新三環(huán)”國(guó)際體系的首要和關(guān)鍵是在“第一環(huán)”，即亞洲兩翼：一翼是東亞，另一翼是中亞、中東。而要繼續(xù)深入推進(jìn)東亞經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化進(jìn)程，加強(qiáng)與中亞、中東的聯(lián)動(dòng)，又要以豐富與亞洲國(guó)家間的交往議題為前提。過(guò)去這些年，中國(guó)致力于推進(jìn)與其他國(guó)家間的經(jīng)濟(jì)外交，有力推進(jìn)了東亞經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化及與亞洲很多國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)合作。東亞經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化最新的、有突破意義的進(jìn)展，是經(jīng)過(guò)多年談判，區(qū)域全面經(jīng)濟(jì)伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定（RCEP）終于達(dá)成并于2022年1月1日正式生效。但東亞國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)往來(lái)，近年越來(lái)越多地受到域外勢(shì)力和安全因素的影響，圍繞南海海洋權(quán)益引發(fā)的爭(zhēng)端、美國(guó)的“印太”戰(zhàn)略，都給東亞經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化進(jìn)程增添了不確定性。中國(guó)應(yīng)走出以往國(guó)際交往中的“GDP至上主義”，重視政治、安全議題，推動(dòng)亞洲國(guó)家間更多的安全合作，避免亞洲內(nèi)部問(wèn)題繼續(xù)被外部力量利用。

▍“新三環(huán)”的物質(zhì)基礎(chǔ)：“南南合作”正在塑造新的全球性體系

中國(guó)推動(dòng)建構(gòu)“新三環(huán)”國(guó)際體系的國(guó)際關(guān)系基礎(chǔ)是“南南合作”，它是一個(gè)老概念，強(qiáng)調(diào)的是非西方“第三世界”國(guó)家間的相互合作、共同扶持。在20世紀(jì)下半葉，南南合作的意義更多是政治性的，發(fā)展中國(guó)家由于普遍經(jīng)濟(jì)不發(fā)達(dá)、技術(shù)水平也較低，相互間的貿(mào)易往來(lái)、技術(shù)交流對(duì)彼此的幫助有限，對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的影響也不大。20世紀(jì)90年代以來(lái)，“南南合作”的概念已逐漸淡出人們視野，中國(guó)的國(guó)際關(guān)系學(xué)界對(duì)它也已關(guān)注不多，但實(shí)際上，“南南合作”在新世紀(jì)以來(lái)正在建立起新的基礎(chǔ)，在今天已更加具有現(xiàn)實(shí)可能性。主要原因是，最近幾十年時(shí)間，亞非拉發(fā)展中國(guó)家在追趕全球化浪潮“借梯上屋”也變成工業(yè)化或準(zhǔn)工業(yè)化國(guó)家，從全球物質(zhì)生產(chǎn)和流通來(lái)說(shuō)，亞非拉發(fā)展中國(guó)家之間已構(gòu)成一個(gè)新的全球性體系，原先的那只由西方國(guó)家搭起來(lái)的全球化“梯子”，在它們眼中已褪去神彩。這個(gè)新的全球性體系主要有以下表現(xiàn)：

首先，發(fā)展中國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)體量全球占比今非昔比。1980年，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家GDP占全球的78.9％，而發(fā)展中國(guó)家僅占21％；2021年，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家占全球GDP的比重跌至 57.8％，發(fā)展中國(guó)家則上升至42.2 ％。由巴西、俄羅斯、印度、中國(guó)組成的金磚四國(guó)（BRIC）再加上土耳其、韓國(guó)和印度尼西亞，這七個(gè)國(guó)家按購(gòu)買(mǎi)力平價(jià)計(jì)算的國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值總和占全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的比重，從1992年18%上升到2021年的 37.36%，而七國(guó)集團(tuán)同期則由51%下降到44%。

其次，發(fā)展中國(guó)家間的貿(mào)易往來(lái)和相互投資也已舉足輕重。中國(guó)與非洲之間的貿(mào)易量在1997~2010年間增加了22.6倍，與拉美的貿(mào)易增長(zhǎng)了22倍；到2021年，中非、中拉貿(mào)易相比2010年又分別增長(zhǎng)2倍、2.5倍。2000年，中阿貿(mào)易額僅為152億美元，到2018年達(dá)到2443億美元，不到20年增長(zhǎng)了16倍。巴西與阿拉伯國(guó)家之間的貿(mào)易額自2003年至2010年增加了4倍，與非洲的貿(mào)易額則增加了5倍，總額達(dá)到260億美元，這一數(shù)字高于巴西與德國(guó)或日本等傳統(tǒng)貿(mào)易伙伴的貿(mào)易額；到2019年，巴西與阿拉伯國(guó)家、非洲的貿(mào)易相比2010年又分別增長(zhǎng) 0.98倍、0.68倍。2001年以來(lái)，印度與非洲貿(mào)易額年均增長(zhǎng)17.2%，2021年比2011年增長(zhǎng)2.26倍。印度與拉丁美洲、中東北非國(guó)家的貿(mào)易，也經(jīng)歷了類(lèi)似的增長(zhǎng)。印度、巴西等新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體之間的相互貿(mào)易和投資也都在迅速升溫，發(fā)展中國(guó)家間的貿(mào)易量增長(zhǎng)速度高于全球平均增速，而與發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的貿(mào)易往來(lái)則持續(xù)下降，這些國(guó)家間在初級(jí)產(chǎn)品和工業(yè)品生產(chǎn)上的分工合作，復(fù)制了歷史上的全球化物質(zhì)產(chǎn)品交換方式。

再有，從中國(guó)周?chē)鷣?lái)看，亞洲已形成一張共在的經(jīng)濟(jì)合作網(wǎng)絡(luò)。具體表現(xiàn)在：

一、亞洲重新成為世界經(jīng)濟(jì)重心。1980年亞洲的發(fā)展中國(guó)家GDP僅占全球的 12.7％，2010年上升至 20.6％，到2021年已達(dá)到31.2 ％。其中東亞國(guó)家（包括中日韓和東南亞10國(guó)）1980年GDP全球占比僅13.7%左右，而到了2020年達(dá)到了 28.8%，翻了一倍多。2020年，RCEP15個(gè)成員國(guó)總?cè)丝谶_(dá)22.7億，GDP達(dá)26萬(wàn)億美元，進(jìn)出口總額超過(guò)10萬(wàn)億美元，均占全球總量約30%。匯豐銀行預(yù)測(cè)，到2030年，RCEP經(jīng)濟(jì)圈的經(jīng)濟(jì)體量全球占比將提高至50%。

二、全球貿(mào)易和投資重心也不斷向亞洲轉(zhuǎn)移。亞洲在全球貿(mào)易中的份額由1980年的 15.7％提高到1990年的22.2%、1995年的27.3%、2000年的26.7%、2001年的25.6 ％，而到2020年又進(jìn)一步上升到占世界貿(mào)易份額的36%，成為世界主要的貿(mào)易集團(tuán)。

三、亞洲內(nèi)部貿(mào)易水平超出與域外貿(mào)易。2001~2020年間，亞洲區(qū)域內(nèi)貿(mào)易總額從3.2萬(wàn)億美元躍升至12.7萬(wàn)億美元，年均名義增長(zhǎng)率達(dá)7.5%。同一時(shí)期，亞洲占世界貿(mào)易總額的比重從25.6%提升至36.0%。2020年，亞洲域內(nèi)貿(mào)易占對(duì)外貿(mào)易的比重已近58.5 %。

四、亞洲兩翼在經(jīng)濟(jì)上正在成為一個(gè)世界，中東能源的流向已由以往主要向歐美轉(zhuǎn)向東亞和南亞。

時(shí)至今日，發(fā)展中國(guó)家已初步形成全球性的經(jīng)濟(jì)體系，但它們之間要達(dá)成更高程度的經(jīng)濟(jì)聯(lián)結(jié)，以及在國(guó)際舞臺(tái)上產(chǎn)生更為強(qiáng)大的政治影響和擺脫西方國(guó)家的控制或強(qiáng)制，還有賴(lài)于在經(jīng)濟(jì)、政治上進(jìn)一步聯(lián)合。這又有賴(lài)于少數(shù)先走一步、經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)發(fā)展水平更為突出的國(guó)家發(fā)揮帶動(dòng)作用。21世紀(jì)第二個(gè)十年以來(lái)，中國(guó)在成為世界第一大實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)體、第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體的同時(shí)，也已成為世界上絕大多數(shù)國(guó)家的最大貿(mào)易伙伴；中國(guó)制造業(yè)全球貢獻(xiàn)率2021年已接近30%，作為全球生產(chǎn)物質(zhì)產(chǎn)品最多的國(guó)家，所扮演的乃是美國(guó)在“二戰(zhàn)”結(jié)束之際的角色（美國(guó)工業(yè)產(chǎn)值在其巔峰的1953年，占了全球28%左右）。中國(guó)可以做，也應(yīng)該做的，是在全球戰(zhàn)略上積極推動(dòng)發(fā)展中國(guó)家間的全球性物質(zhì)交換體系的完善，即真正實(shí)現(xiàn)南南合作。

但還有欠缺。當(dāng)前發(fā)展中國(guó)家的貿(mào)易往來(lái)與相互投資，仍然嚴(yán)重依賴(lài)于西方國(guó)家提供的金融和貨幣網(wǎng)絡(luò)。發(fā)展中國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)、政治自主性要想進(jìn)一步提升，新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體要想在世界體系中獲得與其經(jīng)濟(jì)總量相稱(chēng)的政治影響力，必須擺脫對(duì)西方國(guó)家的金融和貨幣依賴(lài)。因此，構(gòu)建“新三環(huán)”國(guó)際體系，不僅需要考量傳統(tǒng)的地緣因素，也要將幣緣及信（息）緣作為重要考量。過(guò)去一些年，中國(guó)與一些新興市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體開(kāi)展貨幣互換，已在這方面做出探索。廣大發(fā)展中國(guó)家之間應(yīng)該發(fā)展出更高層次、更廣范圍的金融和貨幣合作。為此，需要利用好現(xiàn)有的一些平臺(tái)和機(jī)制，將南南合作提升到新的層次，包括升級(jí)和改造亞投行、金磚國(guó)家銀行，完善自主可控的國(guó)際支付體系；加強(qiáng)上海合作組織的安全合作及其框架下的中俄印伊合作尤其是金融合作，需要看到俄羅斯也是發(fā)展中國(guó)家，中國(guó)和俄羅期之間在經(jīng)濟(jì)上也是高度互補(bǔ)的；在“一帶一路”框架下深入推進(jìn)東亞經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化，特別是鞏固RCEP的成果；構(gòu)建亞洲共同能源市場(chǎng)，使東亞和南亞的能源買(mǎi)方市場(chǎng)與中東、中亞、俄羅斯的能源賣(mài)方市場(chǎng)共在一張能源買(mǎi)賣(mài)和支付網(wǎng)絡(luò)；善用金磚國(guó)家會(huì)議機(jī)制，以此引領(lǐng)南南合作的深化；推動(dòng)國(guó)際貨幣體系多元化和南南合作范疇下的人民幣國(guó)際化，在對(duì)沖美元霸權(quán)的同時(shí)適當(dāng)對(duì)歐元的國(guó)際地位提供支持。

一百年前，中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者們提出了“農(nóng)村包圍城市”的革命之路。在當(dāng)今“百年未有之大變局”之際，中國(guó)和發(fā)展中國(guó)家要破解當(dāng)代世界的中心-邊緣秩序和西方國(guó)家對(duì)非西方國(guó)家的防范打壓，同樣要搞好全球“農(nóng)村”地帶的團(tuán)結(jié)合作。新全球性體系的出現(xiàn)和南南合作的深化，將為中國(guó)進(jìn)入世界經(jīng)濟(jì)、政治最前臺(tái)，以及調(diào)度全球資源構(gòu)建“三環(huán)”國(guó)際體系，化解國(guó)際壓力和突破重圍，創(chuàng)造良好可用條件。在經(jīng)歷四十多年的改革開(kāi)放后，中國(guó)須調(diào)整對(duì)“開(kāi)放”的理解，在對(duì)外往來(lái)的思維上實(shí)現(xiàn)新的突破。當(dāng)然，在盡可能的情況下，中國(guó)仍要努力維持與西方國(guó)家的合作，只要后者不做出完全與中國(guó)為敵的選擇，中國(guó)就不要放棄與之相向而行。

本文發(fā)表于《文化縱橫》2022年6月刊，該期目錄如下，歡迎訂閱紙刊查看更多內(nèi)容：

— ?2022年6月新刊目錄??—

▍編輯手記

烏克蘭危機(jī)與新型國(guó)際體系構(gòu)建

《文化縱橫》編輯部

▍域外

擺脫“資源詛咒”？——海灣六國(guó)的工業(yè)化與經(jīng)濟(jì)多元化

張若楓

白宮新一代對(duì)華戰(zhàn)略操盤(pán)手的思想素描

楊博文

▍封面選題：巨變來(lái)臨——俄烏沖突改變世界

俄烏沖突在2022 年爆發(fā)，以出人意料的方式改變著整個(gè)世界格局。沖突爆發(fā)以來(lái)，以美國(guó)為首的西方把國(guó)際規(guī)則作為武器對(duì)俄進(jìn)行輪番制裁，深刻且全面地動(dòng)搖“二戰(zhàn)”后幾十年來(lái)的國(guó)際治理體系，和平與發(fā)展的時(shí)代主題面臨前所未有的挑戰(zhàn)。俄烏沖突后的世界將向何處去？

跨越俄烏沖突陷阱：重新思考以規(guī)則為核心的國(guó)際秩序

曹遠(yuǎn)征

構(gòu)建“新三環(huán)”：面對(duì)全面脫鉤可能的中國(guó)選擇

程亞文

作為帝國(guó)間沖突的俄烏戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)

張昕

歐洲為什么不能掌控自己的命運(yùn)？

魏南枝

重振領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力：俄烏沖突中的英國(guó)戰(zhàn)略

孔元

▍專(zhuān)題：人類(lèi)文明新形態(tài)

強(qiáng)世功

正是在這短短十幾年中，中國(guó)看待世界的眼光和心態(tài)也悄然發(fā)生了變化：從凸顯中國(guó)特色的特殊主義敘事，轉(zhuǎn)向更為包容世界的普遍主義敘事；從追求被西方承認(rèn)的刻意努力，轉(zhuǎn)向平和心態(tài)的自我認(rèn)同。這種變化最直觀地體現(xiàn)在兩次奧運(yùn)會(huì)的開(kāi)幕式上。

王立勝、晏擴(kuò)明

▍觀念

史觀重建：從“主旋律”到“新主流”

陶慶梅

2021年《覺(jué)醒年代》《山海情》等作品的出現(xiàn)，不但打破了“主旋律”與大眾文化之間的界限，在市場(chǎng)上創(chuàng)造出良好的口碑；更重要的是，它們通過(guò)開(kāi)辟一種新的歷史敘事方式，呼應(yīng)了這個(gè)時(shí)代被掩藏著的某種社會(huì)情緒，帶動(dòng)了更多年輕觀眾的情感，造就了屬于這個(gè)時(shí)代的主流價(jià)值。

周安安、吳靖

從“未來(lái)人”到“頑童”——日本動(dòng)漫與社會(huì)秩序的張力

潘妮妮

從不同時(shí)期的代表性作者與作品中，我們看到了日本動(dòng)漫文化中未成年人位置的變遷：從改造世界的“未來(lái)人”，到被教養(yǎng)的未成年人，再到輕視成人世界并主動(dòng)疏離的“頑童”。這反映了并不存在一個(gè)價(jià)值統(tǒng)一的日本動(dòng)漫文化，正如戰(zhàn)后日本成人社會(huì)的思潮也并非始終如一。

▍社會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)變遷

“波蘭尼時(shí)刻”在當(dāng)代中國(guó)

酈菁

中國(guó)無(wú)法避免全球“波蘭尼時(shí)刻”重現(xiàn)帶來(lái)的社會(huì)壓力和不確定性；并且，由于自身龐大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體量和重要的政治地位，中國(guó)必將在其中扮演重要的角色。

▍公益理論與公益實(shí)踐

社會(huì)組織專(zhuān)業(yè)化的中國(guó)實(shí)踐：慈弘基金會(huì)的探索

張婧

▍反思美國(guó)模式

重新審視“地緣政治學(xué)”——一個(gè)世界史的視角

方旭

韓國(guó)“單一民族”的神話與現(xiàn)實(shí)

鄭立菲

《文化縱橫》國(guó)際傳播系列由三大洲社會(huì)研究所（Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, 網(wǎng)站：www.thetricontinental.org）和東聲（Dongsheng News，網(wǎng)站：www.dongshengnews.org)協(xié)作翻譯并制作，有英語(yǔ)、西語(yǔ)、葡語(yǔ)三個(gè)版本。每期根據(jù)不同主題，從《文化縱橫》雜志過(guò)往發(fā)表文章中，選擇3-5篇文章進(jìn)行編譯，預(yù)計(jì)每季度發(fā)布一期。2023年第1期主題為“重構(gòu)現(xiàn)代世界體系”，主要分析全球緊張局勢(shì)加劇背景下的俄烏戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的全球影響，追溯中西關(guān)系的歷史軌跡，并探討團(tuán)結(jié)廣大第三世界國(guó)家、推動(dòng)構(gòu)建新型國(guó)際體系的可能性。

Five Centuries of Global Transformation: A Chinese Perspective

Humanity is in the midst of a global upheaval, on a scale unseen in 500 years: namely, the relative decline of Europe and the United States, the rise of China and the Global South, and the resulting revolutionary transformation of the international landscape. Although the era of Western global dominance is often said to have lasted five centuries, precisely speaking this is an overstatement. In reality, Europe and the United States have occupied their positions as world hegemons for closer to 200 years, after reaching their initial stages of industrialisation. The first industrial revolution was a turning point in world history, significantly impacting the relationship between the West and the rest of the world. Today, the era of Western hegemony has run its course and a new world order is emerging, with China playing a major role in this development. This article explores how we arrived at the current global conjuncture examining the different stages in the relationship between China and the West.

▍Stage I: A Shifting Balance Between China and the?West

The first encounter between China and Europe dates back to the era of naval exploration of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, during which the Chinese navigator and diplomat Zheng He (1371–1433) embarked on his Voyages Down the Western Seas (鄭和下西洋, Zhèng Hé xià xīyáng) (1405–1433), followed by the Portuguese and Spanish naval expeditions to Asia.?From then on, China has established direct contact with Europe through ocean passages.

During this period China was ruled by the Ming dynasty (1388–1644), which adopted a worldview guided by the concept of?tianxia?(天下, tiānxià, ‘a(chǎn)ll under heaven’).?This belief system generally categorised humanity into two major civilisations: the Chinese who worshipped heaven, or the sky, and the West which, broadly, worshipped gods in a monotheistic sense.?It is important to note that, in this era, the Chinese had a broad conception of the West, considering it to encompass all the regions which expanded northwestward from Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean Sea and then to the Atlantic coast, rather than the contemporary notion which is generally limited to of the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Europe. On the other hand, Chinese civilisation spread to the southeast, from the reaches of the Yellow River to the Yangtze River Basin onward to the coast. The two civilisations would meet at the confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, from which point there has been a complete world history to speak of. At the same time, however, tianxia put forward a universalist conception of the world, in which China and the West were considered to share the same ‘world island’. Separated by the ‘Onion Mountains’ (the Pamir Mountains of Central Asia), each civilisation was thought to have its own history, though there was not yet a unified world history, and each maintained, based on their own knowledge, the tianxia order at their respective ends of the world island.

Although the Ming dynasty discontinued its sea voyages after Zheng He’s seventh mission in 1433, some islands in the South Seas (南洋, nányáng, roughly corresponding to contemporary Southeast Asia) became incorporated into the imperial Chinese tributary system (朝貢, cháogòng). This constituted a major change in the tianxia order, compared with the prior Han (202 BCE–CE 9, 25–220 CE) and Tang (618–907 CE) dynasties in which tribute was mainly received from states of the Western Regions (西域, xīyù, roughly corresponding to contemporary Central Asia). More importantly, this southeastward expansion opened a road into the seas for China, as Chinese people of the southeast coast migrated to the South Seas, and with them goods such as silk, porcelain, and tea entered the maritime trade system. Compared with the prosperous Tang and Song (960–1279) periods, overseas trade expanded, with the Jiangnan (江南, jiāngnán, ‘south of the Yangtze River’) economy, which was largely centred on exports, being particularly dynamic; consequently, industrialisation accelerated and China, for the first time, became the ‘factory of the world’.

European nations did not have the upper hand in their trade with China, however they offset their deficit with the silver that they mined in the newly conquered Americas. This silver flowed into China in large quantities and became a major trading currency, leading to the globalisation of silver. Meanwhile, the introduction of corn and sweet potato seeds, native to the Americas, to China contributed to the rapid growth of the nation’s population due to the suitability of these crops to harsh conditions.

However, China’s involvement in shaping a maritime-linked world order also brought about unexpected problems for the country; namely, an imbalance between its economy, which penetrated the maritime system, and its political and military institutions, which remained continental. This contradiction between the land and the sea produced significant tensions within China, eventually leading to the demise of the Ming dynasty. Border conflicts in the north and northeast required significant financial resources, however most of China’s wealth at that time came from maritime trade and was concentrated in the southeast. Consequently, education thrived in this coastal region, resulting in scholar-officials (士大夫, shìdàfū) from the southeast coming to dominate China’s political processes and prevent tax reforms to better distribute wealth – instead, the traditional tax system was strengthened, imposing larger burdens on the peasantry.?These tensions would eventually come to a head; taxation weighed particularly heavily on northern peasants who mainly lived off farming, leading to their displacement and becoming migrants who eventually overthrew the Ming regime. At the same time, military resources in the north were insufficient, leading to the growing influence of Qing rebel forces in the northeast and their opportunistic advances to the south, culminating in the establishment of the Qing dynasty’s (1636–1912) rule over the entire country.

The Qing dynasty originated among the Manchu people of northeast China, who had agricultural and nomadic cultural roots. As Qing forces marched southwards and founded their empire, they made great efforts to establish control over the regions flanking China from the west and north, an arc extending from the Mongolian Plateau to the Tianshan Mountains and to the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. For thousands of years, these northwest regions were a source of political instability, with successive dynasties trying and failing to unify the whole of China. By integrating these areas into the Chinese state, the Qing dynasty was thus able to achieve this historic political aim of unification. This domestic integration also had an impact on China’s international position, with Russia now becoming the country’s most important neighbour as the overland Silk Road was rerouted northwards, via the Mongolian steppe, through Russia to northern Europe.

By the mid-to-late eighteenth century, these two ‘a(chǎn)rcs’ of development, on the land and sea respectively, held equal weight but differing significance for China: the land provided security, while the seas were the source of vitality. However, both the land and sea developments contained contradictory dynamics: the regions of the northwestern steppe were not very stable internally while relations with neighbouring Russia and the Islamic world remained stable, on the other hand, the southeastern seas were stable internally but introduced new challenges for China in the form of relations with Europe and the United States. These land-sea dynamics have historically presented China with unique trade-offs and, to this day, they remain a fundamental strategic issue.

In contrast, European countries benefited more from direct trade with China, and rose to a dominant position within the new global order.

During the sixteenth century, under the increasingly decadent Roman Catholic Church, ethnic nationalism brewed up in Europe, culminating in Martin Luther’s Reformation in Germany. Subsequently, Europe entered an era of nation-state building known as the early modern period, characterised by the break-up of the authority of the Roman Catholic Church and the establishment of the sovereignty of secular monarchies, which overcame some of the hierarchies and divisions created by the feudal lords and made all subjects equal under the king’s law. The first country to achieve this was England, where Henry VIII banned the Church of England from paying annual tribute to the Papacy in 1533 and passed the Act of Supremacy the following year, establishing the king as the supreme head of the English Church which was made the state religion. This is why England is recognised as the first modern nation, while the constitutional changes were secondary.

The Roman Catholic Church, facing a ruling crisis, sought to open up new pastoral avenues, and began to preach outside of Europe through the voyages of ‘discovery’. Christianity gradually became a world religion, one of the most important developments in the last five centuries, with missionaries finally making their way to China, after many twists and turns, in the late sixteenth century.

The Christian missionaries had prepared to spread their message of truth to the Chinese, who they had expected to be ‘barbarians’. However, to their surprise, they discovered that China was a powerful civilisation with a sophisticated governance system and religious traditions. Although not believing in the personal gods of the missionaries, the Chinese people had a system of moral principles, a highly developed economy, and an established order. This inspired some missionaries to develop a serious appreciation for China, including translating Chinese classics and sending the texts back to Europe, where they would have a notable impact on the Enlightenment in Paris.

During the Enlightenment, Western philosophers developed ideas of humanism and rationalism, including notions that human beings are the subject and a ‘creator’ does not exist; humans should seek their own happiness instead of trying to ascend to the kingdom of God; humans can have sound moral beliefs and relations without relying on religion; the state can establish order without relying on religion; direct rule by the king over all subjects is the best political system, and so on. It is important to note, however, that these Enlightenment ideals, which are said to have formed the basis for Western modernity, had been common knowledge in China for thousands of years. As such, the flow of Chinese ideas and teachings to the West through Christian missionaries can be considered an important, if not the only, influence in the development of Western modernisation. Of course, the Western countries have been the main drivers of global modernisation over the last two centuries, but the modernity that it advocates has long been embedded in other cultures, including China. It is necessary to recognise and affirm this fact to understand the evolution of the world today.

In short, during the first stage of world history, which spanned more than 300 years from the early-to-mid fifteenth century to the mid-to-late eighteenth century, an integrated world system began to form, with both China and the West adjusting, changing, and benefiting in their interactions. From the Chinese perspective, this world order was largely fair.

▍Stage II: Reversals of Fortunes Between China and the West

In the mid-to-late eighteenth century, Western countries utilised their higher levels of industrialisation to secure decisive military superiority, which they abused to conquer and colonise nearly the entire Global South. This brought the world closer together than ever before, but in a union that was unjust and, therefore, unsustainable.

Among the Western countries, England was the first to achieve an advanced stage of industrialisation, for which there was a special reason: colonisation. The British empire appropriated massive amounts of wealth from its colonies, which also served as captive markets for British manufactures. This wealth and market demand, along with England’s relatively small population, drove scientific and technological development, and ultimately industrialisation based on the mining of fossil fuels (namely, coal), and production of steel and machinery. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, England would become the wealthiest and most powerful country in the world, with its wealth spreading to western Europe and its colonial settlements such as the United States and Australia. The thriving European powers violently conquered and colonised the outside world through military force including most of Africa, Asia, and the Americas, eventually reaching China’s doorstep in the early-to-mid nineteenth century. In the preceding centuries of peaceful trading with China, the Western powers accumulated a large trade deficit, which they now sought to balance through the opium trade. However, due to the severe social consequences of this drug trade, China outlawed the importation of opium in 1800; in response the Western powers launched two wars against China – the First Opium War (1839–1842) and the Second Opium War (1856–1860) – to violently open the country’s markets up. After China was defeated, various Western countries, including England, France, Germany, and the United States, forced China to sign unequal treaties granting these nations trade concessions and territories, including Hong Kong. As a result, the tianxia order began to crumble and China entered a period referred to as the ‘century of humiliation’ (百年國(guó)恥, bǎinián guóchǐ).

China’s setback was rooted in the long-standing imbalance between its marine-oriented economy and continental military-political system. First, China’s market relied heavily on foreign trade, but the Qing government failed to develop a sovereign monetary policy, resulting in the trade flow being constantly controlled by foreign powers. Silver from abroad became China’s de facto currency and, with the government unable to exercise effective supervision, the country lost monetary sovereignty and was vulnerable to the fluctuations of silver supplies, destabilising the economy. Second, China’s natural resources were over-exploited to produce large amounts of exports; as a result, the country’s ecological environment was severely damaged. Constrained by both market and resource limitations, China’s endogenous growth hit a chokepoint, as productivity plateaued, employment declined, and surplus populations became displaced, leading to a series of major rebellions in the early-to-mid nineteenth century. It was in this context that the West showed up at China’s doorstep.

Under the pressure of both domestic problems and external aggression, China embarked on the path of ‘learning from the outside world to defend against foreign intervention’ (師夷長(zhǎng)技以制夷, shī yí zhǎng jì yǐ zhì yí), which has been fundamental theme of Chinese history over the past century or so. This formulation, despite having been ridiculed by many since the 1980s following the initiation of China’s economic reforms, epitomises the country’s strategy. On the one hand, China has closely studied the key drivers of Western power, namely industrial production, technological development, economic organisation, and military capability, as well as methods for social mobilisation based on the nation-state. On the other hand, China has sought to learn from other countries for the purpose of advancing its development, securing its independence, and building upon its own heritage.

Until the mid-twentieth century, however, this path did not yield significant changes for China, fundamentally due to its inadequate state capacity, which deteriorated even further after the Qing dynasty fell in 1911. In fact, several initiatives undertaken in the late Qing period to strengthen the state, generated new problems in turn; for example, the ‘New Army’ (新軍, xīnjūn) which was established in the late-nineteenth century in an effort to modernise China’s military would turn into a secessionist force. Meanwhile, theories of development advocated by scholar-officials in this period, such as the concept of ‘national salvation through industry’ (實(shí)業(yè)救國(guó), shíyè jiùguó), were impossible to implement due to the state’s inability to provide institutional support. As such, trade remained China’s fastest growing economic sector, which, despite bringing short-term economic benefits, resulted in China becoming further subordinated to the West.

However, by the time of the Second World War, which was preceded by China’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1937–1945), the country’s international position began to improve, while the West experienced a relative decline. The Second World War and anti-colonial struggles for national liberation dealt a crushing blow to the old imperialist order, as the Western powers were forced to retreat, initiating a decline as they were no longer able to reap colonial dividends. Countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, including China, won their independence; meanwhile, the Soviet Union, stretching across Eurasia, emerged as a significant rival to the West. Amid these global convulsions, China’s weight on the international stage dramatically increased and it became an important force.

In this global context, China began its journey toward national rejuvenation, with two main priorities. The first priority was political; emulating the Soviet Union, China’s Nationalist and the Communist parties established a strong state, which had been the cornerstone of Western economic development, while the lack of state organisation and mobilisation capacity was the greatest weakness of the Qing dynasty in the face of Western powers. The second priority was industrialisation, which advanced in a step by step manner in three phrases.

The first breakthrough in industrialisation took place after the Chinese Revolution in 1949 and was made possible by the help of the Soviet Union, which exported a complete basic industrial system to China. Although this system had serious limitations, which came to a head by the 1970s and 1980s, it allowed China to develop a comprehensive understanding of the systematic nature of industry, especially the underlying structure of industrialisation, that is, heavy industry.

The second breakthrough in industrialisation came after China established diplomatic relations with the United States in the 1970s and began to import technologies from the US and European countries. During this phase, China focused on the development of its southeast coast, a region which had a longstanding history of rural commerce and industry. With the support of machinery and knowledge gained during the first round of industrialisation, the consumer goods sector in the southeast coastal areas was able to develop rapidly at the township level, the level of government which had the most flexibility. By absorbing a large amount of workers, the labour-intensive industrial system significantly improved livelihood for the people.

The third breakthrough in industrialisation, beginning at the turn of the century, was driven by the traditional emphasis for a strong state and a desire to continue the revolution, saw the government devote its capacity to building infrastructure and steering industrial development. As a result, China experienced continuous growth in industrial output and kept moving upwards along the industrial chain, creating the largest and most comprehensive manufacturing sector in the world. The global economic landscape thus changed dramatically.

Today, China is in the midst of its fourth breakthrough in industrialisation, which revolves around the application of information technology to industry. In the current period, the United States is worried about being overtaken by China, which has prompted a fundamental change in bilateral relations and ushered in an era of global change.

In short, at the heart of the second stage of world history were the shifting dynamics between China and the West. For more than 100 years since the early nineteenth century, the Western powers were on the upswing while China experienced a downturn; since the Second World War, however, the trends have reversed, with China on the rise and the West declining. Now it appears that the critical point in this relationship is approaching, where the two sides will reach equivalent positions, exhausting the limits of the old world order.

▍Stage III: The Decline of the US-Led Order

In the wake of China’s rise, the old, Western-dominated world order has been overwhelmed, however, the real trigger for its collapse is the instability resulting from the fact that the United States has been unable to secure the unipolar global dominance which it pursued after the end of the Cold War.

Historically, the Roman empire could not reach India, let alone venture beyond the Onion Mountains; in the other direction, the Han and Tang dynasties could have hardly maintained their power even if they had managed to cross this range. The structural equilibrium for the world is for nations to stay in balance, rather than be ruled by a single centre.

Even the immense technological advances in transportation and warfare have been unable to change this iron law. Prior to the Second World War, the Western powers had penetrated nearly all corners of the world; despite their competing interests and the force needed to maintain their colonies, this system of rule was, in a way, more stable than the current order by distributing power more broadly across the several countries. Meanwhile, in the postwar period, the Soviet Union and the West formed opposing Cold War blocs, with each camp having its own scope of influence and balanced, to an extent, by the other.

In contrast, following the end of the Cold War, the United States became the sole superpower, dominating the entire world. The United States, as the most recently established Western country, the last ‘New World’ to be ‘discovered’ by the Europeans, and the most populous of these powers, was destined to be the final chapter in the West’s efforts to dominate the world. The United States confidently announced that their victory over the Soviet Union constituted ‘the end of history’. However, ambition cannot bypass the hard constraint of reality. Under the sole domination of the United States, the world order immediately became unstable and fragmented; the so-called?Pax Americana?was too short-lived to be written into the pages of history. After the brief ‘end of history’ euphoria under the Clinton and Bush administrations, the Obama era saw the United States initiate a ‘strategic contraction’, seeking to unload its burdens of global rule one after another.

In addition to external costs, Washington’s fleeting pursuit of global hegemony also induced internal strains. Although the United States reaped many dividends from its imperial rule by developing a financial system in which capital could be globally allocated, this came with a cost; as a Chinese saying goes, ‘a(chǎn) blessing might be a misfortune in disguise’ (福兮禍所依, fú xī huò suǒ yī). The boom of the US financial sector, along with the volatile speculation that feeds off it, has caused the country to become deindustrialised, with the livelihoods of the working and middle classes bearing the brunt. Due to the self-protective measures of emerging countries such as China, it was impossible for this financial system to fully extract sufficient external gains to cover the domestic losses suffered by the popular classes due to deindustrialisation. Consequently, the US has developed extreme levels of income inequality, and become sharply polarised, with increasing division and antagonism between different classes and social groups.

Deindustrialisation is at the root of the US crisis. Western superpowers were able to tyrannise the world during the nineteenth century, including their bullying of China, mainly due to their industrial superiority, which allowed them produce the most powerful ships and cannons; deindustrialisation causes the supply of those ‘ships and cannons’ to become inadequate. Even the US military-industrial system has become fragmentary and excessively costly due to the decline of supporting industries. The US elite realises the gravity of this problem, but successive administrations have struggled to address the issue; Obama called for reindustrialisation but made no progress due to the deep impasse between Republicans and Democrats, a dynamic that inhibits effective government action, which Francis Fukuyama termed the ‘vetocracy’; Trump followed this up with the timely slogan ‘Make America Great Again’, promising to make the US the world’s strongest industrial power once more; and this intention can also be seen in the incumbent Biden administration’s push for the enactment of the CHIPS and Science Act and other initiatives aimed at boosting domestic industrial development. However, as long as US finance capital can continue to take advantage of the global system to obtain high profits abroad, it cannot possibly return to domestic US industry and infrastructure. The United States would have to break the power of the financial magnates in order to revive its industry, but how could this even be possible?

In contrast to the deindustrialisation which has taken place in the United States, China is steadily advancing through its fourth breakthrough of industrialisation and rising towards the top of global manufacturing, relying on the solid foundation of a complete industrial chain. Fearing that they will be surpassed in terms of ‘hard power’, the US elite has declared China to be a ‘competitor’ and the nature of relations between the two countries has fundamentally changed.

The US elite have long referred to their country as the ‘City upon a Hill’, a Christian notion by which it is meant that the United States holds an exceptional status in the world and is a ‘beacon’ for other nations to follow. This deep-seated belief of superiority means that Washington cannot accept the ascendance of other nations or civilisations, such as China, which has been following its own path for thousands of years. China’s economic rise and, consequently, its growing influence in reshaping the US-led global order is nothing more than the world returning to a more balanced state; however, this is sacrilegious to Washington, comparable to the rejection of religious conversion for missionaries. It is clear that the US elite have exhausted their goodwill for China, are united in pursuing a hostile strategy against it, and will use all means to disrupt China’s development and influence on the world stage. Washington’s aggressive approach has, in turn, hardened the resolve of China to extricate itself from the confines of the US-led global system.?Pax Americana?will only allow China to develop in a manner which is subordinated to the rule of the United States, and so China has no choice but to take a new path and work to establish a new international order. This struggle between the United States and China is certain to dominate world headlines for the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, there are several factors which decrease the likelihood that the struggle will develop in a catastrophic manner. First, the two countries are geographically separated by the Pacific ocean; and, second, although the United States is a maritime nation adept at offshore balancing, it is much less capable of launching land-based incursions, particularly against a country such as China which is a composite land-sea power with enormous strategic depth. As a result, US efforts to launch a full-scale war against China would be nonviable; even if Washington instigated a naval war in the Western Pacific, the odds would not be in its favour. On top of these two considerations, the United States is, in essence, a ‘commercial republic’ (the initial definition given for the country by one of its Founding Fathers, Alexander Hamilton), meaning that its actions are fundamentally based on cost-benefit calculations; China, on the contrary, is highly experienced in dealing with aggressive external forces.?Altogether, these factors all but guarantee that a full-frontal war between the two countries can be entirely avoided.

In this regard, the shifting positions of China and the United States vary greatly from similar dynamics in the past, such as the evolving hegemony on the European continent in recent centuries. In the latter context, the narrow confines of Europe cannot allow for multiple major powers, whereas the vast Pacific Ocean certainly can. This situation constitutes the bottom line of the relationship between the two countries. Therefore, while China and the United States will compete on all fronts, as long as China continues to increase its economic and military strength and clearly demonstrates its willingness to use that power, the United States will retreat in the same rational manner as its former suzerain, Britain, did. Once the United States withdraws from East Asia and the Western Pacific, a new world order will begin to take shape.

Over the past few years, China’s efforts in this respect have paid off, causing some within the United States to recognise China’s power and determination, and adjust their strategy accordingly, pressuring allied countries to bear greater costs to uphold the Western-led order. Despite the posturing of the Western countries, there is, in fact, no such ‘a(chǎn)lliance of democracies’; the US has always based its alliance system on common interests, of which the most important is to work together, not to advance any high-minded ideal, but to bleed other countries dry. Once these countries can no longer secure external profits together, they will have to compete with each other and their alliance system will promptly break up. In such a situation, the Western countries would return to a state similar to the period before the Second World War; fighting each other for survival rather than to carve the world into colonies. This battle of nations, although not necessarily through hot war, could cause the Western countries to backslide to their early modern state.

The willingness of the United States to do anything in its pursuit of profit, has led to the rapid crumbling of its value system. Since former President Woodrow Wilson led the country to its position as the leader of the world system, values have been at the core of the US appeal. At that time, Wilson held sway with many Chinese intellectuals, though disillusion soon followed; meanwhile, today, the myth of the ‘American dream’ and universal values of the United States remains charismatic to a considerable proportion of Chinese elites, however, the experience of the Trump presidency has torn the mask off these purported values. The United States has openly returned to the vulgarity and brutality of colonial conquest and westward expansion.

In addition, the current generation of Western elites suffers from a deficit in its capacity for strategic thinking. Many of the leading strategists and tacticians of the Cold War have now died, and amid hubris and dominance of the two decade ‘end of history’ era, the United States and European countries did not really produce a new generation of sharp intellectual figures. Consequently, in the face of their current dilemmas, the best that this generation of elites can offer is nothing more than repurposing old solutions and returning to the vulgarity of the colonial period.

This kind of vulgarity may be shocking to some, however it has deep roots in US history: from the Puritan colonists genocide against indigenous peoples in order to build their so-called ‘City upon a Hill’; to many of its founding fathers having been slave owners, who enshrined slavery in the Constitution; to the Federalist Papers which designed a complex system of separation of powers to guarantee freedom, but coldly discussed war and trade between countries; and to the country’s obsession with the right to bear arms, giving each person the right to kill in the name of freedom. Thus, we can see that Trump did not bring vulgarity to the United States, but only revealed the hidden tradition of the ‘commercial republic’ (it is worth noting that, in the Western tradition, merchants also tended to be plunderers and pirates).

Today, the United States has nearly completed this transformation of its identity: from a republic of values to a republic of commerce. This version of the country does not possess the united will to resume its position as leader of the world order, as evidenced by the strong and continued influence of the ‘America First’ rhetoric. The rising support among certain sections of the US population for such political vulgarity will encourage more politicians to follow this example.

The world order continues to be led by a number of powerful states, but is in the midst of great instability as efforts to strengthen the European Union have failed, Russia is likely to continue to decline, China is growing, Japan and South Korea lack real autonomy, and the United States, due to financial pressures, is rapidly shedding its responsibilities to support the network of post-war global multilateral institutions and alliances and instead seeks to build bilateral systems to maximise its specific interests. Put simply, the world order is falling apart; presently, the relevant questions are related to how rapid this breakdown will be, what an alternative new order should look like, and whether this new order can emerge and take effect in time to avoid widespread serious global instability.

▍China’s Role in Reshaping the World Order

A new international order has begun to emerge amid the disintegration of the old system. The main generative force in this dynamic is China, which is already the second largest economy in the world and is a civilisation that is distinct from the West.

China is one of the largest countries in the world and its long history has endowed it with experiences that are relevant to matters of global governance. With its immense size and diversity, China contains a world order within itself and has historically played a leading role in establishing a tianxia system that stretched over land and sea, from Central Asia to the South Seas. Alongside its rich history, China has also transformed itself into a modern country over the past century, having learned from Western experiences and its own tradition of modernity. By sharing the wisdom of its ancient history and the lessons of its modern development, China can play a constructive role in global efforts to address imbalances in the world order and build a new system in three major ways.

1. The restoration of balanced global development.?The classical order on the ‘world island’ (世界島, shì jiè daǒ, roughly corresponding to Eurasia) leaned toward the continental nations, while the modern world order has been largely dominated by Western maritime powers. As a result, the world island became fractured, with the former centre of civilisation becoming a site of chaos and unending wars.?Pax Americana?was unable to establish a stable form of rule over the world island, as the United States was separated from this region by the sea and was unable to form constructive relations with non-Western countries. Therefore, the United States was only able to maintain a maritime order, rather than a world order. It relied on brutal military interventions into the centre of the world island, hastily retreating after wreaking havoc and leaving the region in a perpetual state of rupture.

Conversely, China’s approach to the construction of a new international order is that of ‘listening to both sides and choosing the middle course’ (執(zhí)兩用中, zhí liǎng yòng zhōng). Historically, China successfully balanced the land and sea; during the Han and Tang dynasties, for instance, China accumulated experience in interacting with land-based civilisations, meanwhile, since the Song and Ming dynasties, China has been deeply involved in the maritime trade system. It is based on this historical experience that China has proposed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which the most important aspect is the incorporation of the world island and the oceans, accommodating both the ancient and modern orders. The BRI offers a proposal to develop an integrated and balanced world system, with the ‘Belt’ aiming to restore order on the world island, while the ‘Road’ is oriented towards the order on the seas. Alongside this initiative, China has built corresponding institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

2. Moving beyond capitalism and promoting people-centred development.?The system on which Western power and prosperity has been built is capitalism, rooted in European legacies of the merchant-marauder duality and colonial conquest, driven by the pursuit of monetary profits, managing capital with a monstrously developed financial system, and hinging on trade. Under capitalism, the Western powers have viewed countries of the Global South as ‘others’, treating them as hunting grounds for cheap resources or markets. Although the Western powers have been able to occupy and spread capitalism to much of the world, they have not been able to widely cultivate prosperity, too often tending towards malicious opportunism; for those countries that do not profit from colonialism, but suffer from its brutal oppression, the system is nonviable. As a result, since the Western powers took charge of the world in the nineteenth century, the vast majority of non-Western countries have been unable to attain industrial or modern development, a track record which disproves the purported universality of capitalism.

The ancient Chinese sages advocated for a socioeconomic model that Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a leader in the 1911 revolution to overthrow of the Qing dynasty and the first president of the Republic of China, called the ‘Principles of People’s Livelihood’ (民生主義, mínshēng zhǔyì) which can be rephrased as ‘the philosophy of benefiting the people’ (厚生主義, Hòushēng zhǔyì). This philosophy, which values the production, utilisation, and distribution of material to allow people to live better and in a sustainable manner, dates back over 2000 years, appearing as early as the?Book of Documents?(尚書(shū), shàngshū), an ancient Confucian text. Guided by this philosophy, a policy of ‘promoting the fundamental and suppressing the incidental’ (崇本抑末, chóngběn yìmò) was adopted in ancient China to orient commercial and financial activities towards production and people’s livelihood. Today, China has rejuvenated this model and begun to share it with other countries through the BRI, which has taken the approach of teaching others ‘how to fish’, emphasising the improvement of infrastructure and advancement of industrialisation.

China, which is now the world’s factory and continues to upgrade its industries, is also driving a reconfiguration of the world’s division of labour: upstream, accepting components produced by cutting-edge manufacturing in Western countries; downstream, transferring productive and manufacturing capacity to underdeveloped countries, particularly in Africa. As the world’s largest consumer market, China should access energy from different parts of the world in a fair and even manner, and promote global policies which emphasise production (‘the fundamental’) and minimise financial speculation (‘the incidental’).

3. Towards a world of unity and diversity.?When the European powers established the current world order, they generally pursued ‘homogenisation’, inclined to use violence to impose their system on other countries and inevitably creating enemies. The United States, influenced by Christian Puritanism, tends to believe in the uniformity of values, imposing its purported ‘universal values’ on the world, and denouncing any nation that differs from its conceptions as ‘evil’ and an enemy. During ‘the end of history’ period, this tendency was exemplified by the so-called War on Terror which launched invasions and missiles throughout the Middle East. Despite this preoccupation with homogenisation, the US-led order is being unravelled by rampant polarisation, broken apart by intensifying cultural and political divisions.

China, on the other hand, tells a different story. For millennia, based on the principle of ‘multiple gods united in one heaven’ or ‘one culture and multiple deisms’, various religious and ethnic groups have been integrated within China through the worship of heaven or the culture, thus developing the nation and the tianxia system of unity and diversity. Universal order or harmony can neither be attained through violent conquest nor through the preaching and imposition of values to change ‘the other’ into ‘self’, but rather by recognising the autonomy of ‘the other’; as emphasised in?The Analects of Confucius?(論語(yǔ)·季氏, lúnyǔ·jìshì), ‘…all the influences of civil culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract them to be so; and when they have been so attracted, they must be made contented and tranquil’ (修文德以來(lái)之，既來(lái)之，則安之, xiūwén dé yǐlái zhī, jì lái zhī, zé ānzhī). By and large, it is along this path of harmony in diversity that China today conducts international relations.

China should understand the building of a new international order through the lens of revitalising the tianxia order, and its approach should be guided by the sages’ way of ‘harmonising all nations’ (協(xié)和萬(wàn)邦, xiéhé wànbāng) to pacify the tianxia. The process of constructing a new international order, or a revitalised tianxia order, should adhere to the following considerations:

1. A tianxia order will not be built at once but progressively.?A Chinese idiom can be used to describe the China-led process of forming a new global system: ‘Although Zhou was an old country, the (favouring) appointment alighted on it recently’ (周雖舊邦,其命維新, zhōu suī jiù bāng, qí mìng wéixīn). Zhou was an old kingdom that was governed by moral edification; its influence gradually expanded, first to neighbouring states and then beyond, until two thirds of the tianxia paid allegiance to the kingdom and the existing Yin dynasty (c. 1600–1045 BCE) was replaced by the Zhou dynasty (c.?1045– 256 BCE). In approaching the construction of a new international order and revitalising the concept of tianxia, China should follow this progressive approach to avoiding a collision with the existing hegemonic system. The concept of tianxia refers to a historical process without end.

2. Virtue and propriety are the first priority in maintaining the emerging tianxia system.?A tianxia system aims to ‘harmonise all nations’, not to establish closed alliances or demand homogeneity. China should promote morality, decency, and shared economic prosperity in relations between nations and international law. What distinguishes this approach from the existing system of international law is that, in addition to clarifying the rights and obligations of each party, it also emphasises building mutual affection and rapport between nations.

3. A tianxia order will not seek to monopolise the entire world.?The world is too large to be effectively governed by any country alone. The sages understood this and so their tianxia order never attempted to expand all over the known world at the time, nor did later generations; for instance, Zheng He came across many nations during his voyages to the Western Seas, but the Ming dynasty did not colonise and conquer them, nor did he include them all in the tributary system, but instead allowed them to make their own choices. Today, China does not seek to impose any system onto other countries; with such moderation, the struggle for hegemony can be avoided.

4. A new international order will consist of several regional systems.?Instead of a world system governed by one dominant country or a small group of powers, a new global order will likely be made up of several regional systems. Across the world, countries with common geographies, cultures, belief systems, and interests have already begun to form their own regional organisations, such as in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Atlantic states; China should focus on the Western Pacific and Eurasia.

The concept of regional systems shares some similarities with Samuel Huntington’s division of civilisations, however, importantly, it does not necessitate any clash between them. As a large country and land-sea power, China will likely overlap with multiple regional systems, including both maritime- and land-based regional systems. China, which literally means ‘the country of the middle’, should serve as a harmoniser between different regional systems and act to mitigate conflict and confrontation; in this way, a new international order of both unity and diversity can emerge.

A new architecture of global governance will be built gradually, with layers nested upon each other from the inside out. To this end, China’s efforts should begin in the innermost layer to which it belongs, East Asia. Traditionally, China, the Korean peninsula, Vietnam, Japan, and other countries in this region formed a Confucian cultural sphere; however, after the Second World War, despite these nations successfully modernising, relations between them have deteriorated due to the pressures of foreign powers, such as the United States and Soviet Union. China’s efforts to reorganise the world order must start from here, by revitalising this shared heritage, developing coordinated regional policies based on the ‘Principles of People’s Livelihood’, and demonstrating improved standards of prosperity and civility for the world. As the achievements and strength of such regional efforts grow, the power of the United States and its world order will inevitably fade out, and the process of global transformation will rapidly accelerate.

After the inner layer of East Asia, the next-most nested layer, or middle layer, that China should focus on is the heart of the world island, Eurasia. Central to these regional efforts is the SCO, in which China, Russia, India, and Pakistan are already member states, Iran and Afghanistan are observer states, and Turkey and Germany can be invited. Due to its economic decline and weakening global influence, Russia is likely to increase its focus on its neighbouring regions, namely Central Asia, and to participate more actively in the SCO, including assisting in efforts to promote harmonious relations and development in the region and minimising conflict. The stability of Eurasia is key, not only to the security and prosperity of China, particularly its western regions, but to overall global peace.

Finally, the outermost layer for China is the institutionalised BRI, which connects nations and regions across the world. Proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013, to date China has signed more than 200 BRI cooperation agreements with 149 countries and 32 international organisations.

▍Concluding Remarks

The evolution and future direction of the world order cannot be understood without examining the shifting relationship between China and the West over the past five centuries. In the early modern era, the Western powers were inspired by China in their pursuit of modernisation; in the past century, China has learned from the West. The reemergence of China has shaken the foundations of the old Western-dominated world order and is a driving force in the formation of a new international system. Amid the momentous changes in the global landscape, it is necessary to recognise the strengths and limits of Western modernity, ideologies, and institutions, while also appreciating the Chinese tradition of modernity and its developments in the current era. For China, this requires a restructuring of its knowledge system, guided by a new vision which is inspired by classical Chinese wisdom: ‘Chinese learning as substance, Western learning for application’ (中學(xué)為體，西學(xué)為用, Zhōngxué wèi tǐ, xīxué wèi yòng).

人類(lèi)正在經(jīng)歷五百年未有之大變局：歐美相對(duì)衰落，中國(guó)等非西方世界興起，世界格局因此出現(xiàn)革命性變化。

不過(guò)，嚴(yán)格說(shuō)來(lái)，言“五百年”之大變局，或許有點(diǎn)夸張。略加考察即可發(fā)現(xiàn)，歐美之強(qiáng)不過(guò)持續(xù)兩百年而已，以其初步完成工業(yè)化為開(kāi)端。

故五百年來(lái)之世界史，可以工業(yè)化為限，粗劃為兩階段，其間中、西之勢(shì)有較大變化。

西方今日已至其兩百年強(qiáng)弩之末，新世界秩序已在構(gòu)建之中，中國(guó)是主要塑造者。

▍世界史第一階段：中西平衡，各得其所

名副其實(shí)的“世界歷史”始于鄭和下西洋，時(shí)當(dāng)十五世紀(jì)初，略早于葡萄牙、西班牙人的大航海。隨著中國(guó)與歐洲通過(guò)海洋通道直接聯(lián)系，世界第一次連為一體。

本乎各自終極信念，人類(lèi)文明約有兩大類(lèi)型：中國(guó)人敬天，中國(guó)以外各族群普遍信神，一神教是其較成熟者，是為廣義的西方。

中國(guó)與西方共在“世界島”，但蔥嶺（即帕米爾高原）隔絕中、西，各有其歷史而無(wú)世界史?；谄浼扔兄R(shí)，中國(guó)人、西方人在世界島兩端分別維護(hù)天下秩序和普世秩序。

廣義西方演進(jìn)之大勢(shì)是向西、北移動(dòng)，發(fā)端于從兩河流域，然后到地中海周邊，再到大西洋濱海，而有狹義的西方即歐美。

中國(guó)文明演進(jìn)大勢(shì)是逐漸向東、南移動(dòng)，由黃河流域至于長(zhǎng)江流域，以至于東南沿海，明太祖定都南京，即體現(xiàn)了這一趨勢(shì)，由此必定經(jīng)營(yíng)海洋經(jīng)濟(jì)。

兩者先后下海，人類(lèi)文明兩大類(lèi)型直接相會(huì)于印太交匯處，此后則有完整世界歷史可言。

鄭和下西洋雖然中止，但一些南洋島國(guó)進(jìn)入朝貢秩序，此為天下秩序之重大變化，漢唐是以西域邦國(guó)為主的。

更重要的是，中國(guó)人下海之路已打通，東南沿海民眾移民南洋，絲綢、瓷器、茶葉等貨物進(jìn)入海洋貿(mào)易體系。相比于唐宋時(shí)代，海外貿(mào)易規(guī)模擴(kuò)大，江南經(jīng)濟(jì)在很大程度上圍繞出口展開(kāi)，其工業(yè)化進(jìn)程加快，中國(guó)成為“世界工廠”。

歐人在中西貿(mào)易中不占優(yōu)勢(shì)，乃以其在新征服的美洲所開(kāi)采之白銀彌補(bǔ)逆差。白銀大量流入中國(guó)，成為大宗交易貨幣。由此而有“白銀全球化”。

原產(chǎn)于美洲的玉米、白薯種子陸續(xù)傳入中國(guó)，適宜條件比較惡劣的土地，中國(guó)人口迅速增長(zhǎng)。

然而，中國(guó)參與塑造海洋聯(lián)結(jié)的世界秩序，給自己帶來(lái)了意料之外的麻煩：中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)已深入海洋體系，政治軍事安排卻仍是大陸體系，兩者緊張、撕裂。

明朝即亡于海、陸間之緊張：中國(guó)邊患在北方、東北，此為明成祖遷都北京之主要考量，而一旦遷都北京，國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略重心轉(zhuǎn)移，必然停止經(jīng)營(yíng)南洋；應(yīng)對(duì)北方邊患為國(guó)家財(cái)政重點(diǎn)，而當(dāng)時(shí)財(cái)富多來(lái)自海洋貿(mào)易，集中于東南；

其地教育發(fā)達(dá)，東南士大夫得以主宰政治進(jìn)程，為自身利益，阻礙稅制調(diào)整，反而強(qiáng)化傳統(tǒng)稅制，強(qiáng)加于農(nóng)民；以耕種為主業(yè)的北方農(nóng)民負(fù)擔(dān)沉重，淪為流民，轉(zhuǎn)成流寇，最終顛覆明鼎；同時(shí)，北方軍需供應(yīng)不足，滿(mǎn)清在東北日益坐大，趁機(jī)南下取天下。

滿(mǎn)清成長(zhǎng)于東北，長(zhǎng)期與農(nóng)耕、游牧兩類(lèi)文明區(qū)打交道，故南下立國(guó)之后，在南面治中原之外，積極經(jīng)營(yíng)“中國(guó)弧”地帶，即在北、西兩邊環(huán)繞中國(guó)的蒙古高原、天山南北與青藏高原。

幾千年來(lái)，在此地帶此起彼伏的游牧民族不斷進(jìn)入中原，擾亂天下。滿(mǎn)清在漢唐元明苦心經(jīng)營(yíng)的基礎(chǔ)上，以復(fù)雜靈活的政治機(jī)制把西、北中國(guó)弧完整納入中國(guó)政治體，初步解決了困擾中國(guó)四千年的大難題。

由此，國(guó)際格局也有改變：俄羅斯成為中國(guó)鄰國(guó)，并最為緊要；陸上絲綢之路轉(zhuǎn)而取道蒙古草原北上，經(jīng)俄羅斯，終于北歐。

綜合以上兩大趨勢(shì)可見(jiàn)，至十八世紀(jì)中后期，中國(guó)為海、陸兩個(gè)弧面所合，兩者分量相當(dāng)，但對(duì)中國(guó)的作用不同：中國(guó)生機(jī)在海上，安全系于陸地。

西北草原弧內(nèi)部不甚穩(wěn)定，外接的俄羅斯和伊斯蘭世界尚較傳統(tǒng)；東南海洋弧內(nèi)部穩(wěn)定，外接的歐美有新因素涌現(xiàn)。中國(guó)涵攝海陸的格局在全世界大國(guó)中是獨(dú)一無(wú)二的，其后至今，根本戰(zhàn)略問(wèn)題是權(quán)衡取舍者兩者。

相對(duì)而言，歐洲從與中國(guó)的直接交往、也即從新世界秩序中受益更大。

進(jìn)入十六世紀(jì)，羅馬教會(huì)日益腐朽，歐洲民族-國(guó)家主義（nationalism）發(fā)酵，終由馬丁?路德在日耳曼掀起宗教改革大潮。由此，歐洲進(jìn)入國(guó)民-民族國(guó)家構(gòu)建（nation-state building）時(shí)代，史稱(chēng)“早期現(xiàn)代”。

早期現(xiàn)代之歷史主題是打破羅馬教會(huì)一統(tǒng)權(quán)威，確立世俗王權(quán)之主權(quán)地位，此主權(quán)打破封建領(lǐng)主所造成的等級(jí)和分割，所有臣民在國(guó)王法律下平等。

最先取得成功的是英格蘭，1533年，亨利八世禁止英格蘭教會(huì)向教廷繳納歲貢，次年通過(guò)《至尊法案》，確立國(guó)王為教會(huì)最高領(lǐng)袖，并以之為國(guó)教。英國(guó)被公認(rèn)為第一個(gè)現(xiàn)代國(guó)家之理由在此，憲制變革則在從屬地位。

面臨統(tǒng)治危機(jī)的羅馬教會(huì)尋求開(kāi)辟新的靈牧場(chǎng)，乃沿大航海所發(fā)現(xiàn)的航路向歐洲以外傳教，耶教逐漸成為世界性宗教，此為近五百年之大事件。十六世紀(jì)后期，傳教士幾經(jīng)輾轉(zhuǎn)，進(jìn)入中國(guó)。

傳教士本來(lái)準(zhǔn)備向其想象中野蠻的中國(guó)人傳播真理，但很快發(fā)現(xiàn)中國(guó)是高度文明的大國(guó)，中國(guó)政教之美超出其神學(xué)知識(shí)范圍：中國(guó)人不信奉其所熟悉的人格神，卻普遍有道德，有高度發(fā)達(dá)的經(jīng)濟(jì)和井然有序的秩序。有些人受到觸動(dòng)，乃轉(zhuǎn)而認(rèn)真對(duì)待中國(guó)，翻譯中國(guó)經(jīng)典，送回巴黎。

由此而有巴黎的啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)。此前一千五百年，歐洲鎖死在神教蒙昧中，即便中世紀(jì)重新發(fā)現(xiàn)古希臘哲學(xué)，也只作為神學(xué)的侍婢，用來(lái)證明人格神是存在的。

中國(guó)的國(guó)家及其思想則向西人展示了人生、秩序的另一可能，依西人關(guān)于現(xiàn)代一詞的定義，中國(guó)文明自誕生起就是現(xiàn)代的?？梢韵胍?jiàn)初次接觸中學(xué)的西人之心靈震撼。

由此，西方哲人走上人文主義、理性主義，形成所謂現(xiàn)代觀念和制度。啟蒙哲人宣布：人是主體，沒(méi)有造物主；人應(yīng)求自身幸福，而非升入神的國(guó)；人完全可以不依神教而有健全道德和良好人際關(guān)系，國(guó)家完全可以不依神教而有良好秩序，國(guó)王直接統(tǒng)治全體臣民是最好的政治等等。西人在啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)中所倡導(dǎo)的所謂現(xiàn)代觀念和制度，在中國(guó)早已是幾千年的常識(shí)。

故“中學(xué)西漸”大潮推動(dòng)了西方的現(xiàn)代化，不可謂之唯一力量，但可謂之重要力量，中國(guó)思想啟發(fā)了西方哲人或鞏固了其苦思所得之靈感。

就現(xiàn)實(shí)表現(xiàn)看，西方是過(guò)去兩百年全球現(xiàn)代化的主要推動(dòng)者，但中國(guó)文化已內(nèi)在其中，西人以其蠻力向全世界傳播中國(guó)觀念，當(dāng)然是西方化的。認(rèn)識(shí)和肯定這一點(diǎn)，才能理解今日世界演變之大勢(shì)。

總之，在十五世紀(jì)初中期到十八世紀(jì)中后期三百多年的世界歷史第一階段，完整的世界初步形成，中國(guó)和西方在互動(dòng)中皆有調(diào)整、變化，各有所得。從中國(guó)人角度看，如此世界秩序大體是公平的。

▍世界史第二階段：中西之位的往復(fù)

十八世紀(jì)中后期，西方通過(guò)工業(yè)化獲得軍事優(yōu)勢(shì)，乃加以濫用，四處征服、殖民。世界固然因此而空前緊密地連為一體，但其秩序不公，因而最終難以持續(xù)，中國(guó)是重要的改變力量。

世界歷史進(jìn)入第二階段的關(guān)鍵因素是西方實(shí)現(xiàn)工業(yè)化，中西之勢(shì)的轉(zhuǎn)移之源在此。

不過(guò)，細(xì)加分析即可發(fā)現(xiàn)，西方工業(yè)化多有得益于中國(guó)之處：在知識(shí)上，西人曾長(zhǎng)期致力于思辨現(xiàn)實(shí)以外的存在，當(dāng)其哲學(xué)轉(zhuǎn)而肯定人為主體，則有“認(rèn)識(shí)論轉(zhuǎn)向”，轉(zhuǎn)而面向現(xiàn)存之物，發(fā)展出分解-重構(gòu)的方法，以之發(fā)現(xiàn)物之構(gòu)造機(jī)理，進(jìn)而運(yùn)用技術(shù)手段制造人造物。

在制度上，啟蒙哲人受中國(guó)啟發(fā)而有“開(kāi)明專(zhuān)制”觀念，支持強(qiáng)大王權(quán)，西方乃超越古典城邦和教會(huì)政治，建立大范圍國(guó)民-民族國(guó)家；又受重農(nóng)學(xué)派等中國(guó)化思想影響，此國(guó)家重視工業(yè)生產(chǎn)，而傳統(tǒng)上西方城邦多重貿(mào)易。

在西方各國(guó)中，英格蘭率先推進(jìn)工業(yè)化，則另有原因：殖民征服造就巨大海外市場(chǎng)需求，而英格蘭人口有限，不能不尋找新技術(shù)；技術(shù)需求推動(dòng)科學(xué)發(fā)展，科學(xué)、技術(shù)、工業(yè)良性互動(dòng)，最終摸索到基于石化能源、鋼鐵機(jī)器生產(chǎn)的工業(yè)化之路。

英格蘭率先富強(qiáng)，隨后其技術(shù)、制度傳如歐洲大陸。富強(qiáng)的歐洲列強(qiáng)憑其堅(jiān)船利炮，對(duì)外征服、殖民。西方列強(qiáng)陸續(xù)征服非洲、中東、印度等地，終至中國(guó)門(mén)口。

西方在此前三百年與中國(guó)的和平通商中始終有巨額逆差，乃通過(guò)鴉片貿(mào)易彌補(bǔ)；遭中國(guó)抵制后則發(fā)動(dòng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。中國(guó)遭遇失敗，以中國(guó)為中心的普遍世界秩序——天下體系，趨于解體，被迫降格為民族國(guó)家，以救亡圖存。

中國(guó)失敗的原因主要在海洋型經(jīng)濟(jì)與大陸型軍政體制的嚴(yán)重錯(cuò)位：第一，中國(guó)市場(chǎng)嚴(yán)重依賴(lài)海外，但政府未能及時(shí)轉(zhuǎn)型，貿(mào)易流始終在他人控制下。

第二，海外白銀流入為貨幣，政府未予有效管理，喪失貨幣主權(quán)，當(dāng)其供應(yīng)量波動(dòng)時(shí)束手無(wú)策，經(jīng)濟(jì)無(wú)法正常運(yùn)作。

第三，中國(guó)是世界工廠，產(chǎn)品大量出口，卻未及時(shí)打開(kāi)從外部獲取資源的通道。以一國(guó)有限資源支撐世界工廠運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)，資源過(guò)度開(kāi)發(fā)，生態(tài)遭嚴(yán)重破壞。

受制于市場(chǎng)和資源的雙重約束，中國(guó)的內(nèi)生性增長(zhǎng)遭遇瓶頸，生產(chǎn)率不再增長(zhǎng)，就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)減少，新增人口成為流民，終致十九世紀(jì)初中期連續(xù)發(fā)生流民大叛亂。西方人正在此時(shí)來(lái)到中國(guó)門(mén)口。

在內(nèi)憂外患?jí)毫ο?，中?guó)走上“師夷長(zhǎng)技以制夷”之路，此為過(guò)去一百多年來(lái)中國(guó)歷史之基本主題。八十年代以來(lái)很多人嘲笑這句話，但它確足以概括百多年來(lái)中國(guó)人之所為：

一方面學(xué)習(xí)西方之術(shù)，首先是軍事技術(shù)，其次是支撐它的工業(yè)生產(chǎn)和組織技術(shù)，還有基于國(guó)民-民族國(guó)家的社會(huì)動(dòng)員技術(shù)，此為西方力量所在，中國(guó)人努力學(xué)習(xí)之。另一方面，中國(guó)有悠久深厚的文明傳統(tǒng)，學(xué)習(xí)目的始終是自強(qiáng)、自立。

到直到二十世紀(jì)中期的一百年，中國(guó)變化不大。根本原因仍在于國(guó)家能力低下，尤其是滿(mǎn)清覆亡，本已低下的國(guó)家能力頹然解體，于是，晚清建設(shè)的某些現(xiàn)代機(jī)制反成禍亂之源，如新軍墮落為分裂國(guó)家的力量。

晚清士大夫曾倡導(dǎo)“實(shí)業(yè)救國(guó)”，因?yàn)槿狈?guó)家的制度支撐，根本無(wú)從展開(kāi)。經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域發(fā)展最快的仍為貿(mào)易，固然暫時(shí)帶來(lái)經(jīng)濟(jì)好處，但長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)而言，中國(guó)更深地淪為西方依附者。

到了以抗日戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)為先導(dǎo)的二戰(zhàn)時(shí)，中國(guó)國(guó)運(yùn)終于開(kāi)始上升，而西方則開(kāi)始相對(duì)衰落：二戰(zhàn)打垮老式帝國(guó)主義，原來(lái)統(tǒng)治全世界的西方列強(qiáng)退守本土，無(wú)從獲得殖民紅利，緩慢走上衰落之路。

包括中國(guó)在內(nèi)的亞非拉國(guó)家實(shí)現(xiàn)獨(dú)立自主。介乎歐亞之間的蘇聯(lián)崛起，與西方分庭抗禮；在兩大陣營(yíng)之間的中國(guó)的分量陡然加重，成為決定性第三方。

在此格局中，中國(guó)走上強(qiáng)國(guó)復(fù)興之路：首先，政治上，國(guó)共兩黨共同學(xué)習(xí)蘇聯(lián)，終于建立強(qiáng)國(guó)家，西方經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展是以此為基礎(chǔ)的。滿(mǎn)清面對(duì)西方列強(qiáng)的最大劣勢(shì)就是國(guó)家組織力低下而缺乏動(dòng)員能力。其次，工業(yè)化得以循序推進(jìn)，可分為三個(gè)階段：

工業(yè)化第一輪突破得益于蘇聯(lián)的幫助。面對(duì)中國(guó)，重貿(mào)易的歐美海洋國(guó)家主要看重中國(guó)的龐大市場(chǎng)，故與中國(guó)的關(guān)系始終淺嘗輒止，隨時(shí)可以退出。

蘇聯(lián)作為有野心的中國(guó)陸上鄰國(guó)，當(dāng)海洋國(guó)家欲控制中國(guó)時(shí)通常支持中國(guó)以抗衡之，晚清以來(lái)即是如此，五六十年代的支持力度最大，向中國(guó)輸入全套工業(yè)體系。

此體系確有嚴(yán)重偏頗，故至七、八十年代陷入困境，但國(guó)人畢竟由此完整認(rèn)識(shí)了工業(yè)的體系性，尤其觸及工業(yè)化底層架構(gòu)即能源和重工業(yè)，而明清時(shí)代的工業(yè)化就卡在這一環(huán)節(jié)上，而漸顯落后。

尤其是這些工業(yè)大量布局于大陸深處的西北弧面，在一定程度上逆轉(zhuǎn)了中唐以來(lái)日益嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)重心失衡局面，這是今天以至未來(lái)長(zhǎng)時(shí)期內(nèi)恢復(fù)國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)布局平衡之基礎(chǔ)。此為中國(guó)工業(yè)化第一輪突破。

第二輪突破在中美建交后。中美聯(lián)手，致蘇聯(lián)崩潰，中國(guó)免去北顧之憂，側(cè)重發(fā)展東南沿海，這就回到了明清時(shí)代的工業(yè)化模式：工業(yè)化以家戶(hù)為基本單位分散在鄉(xiāng)村，以海洋為通道借重歐美海洋國(guó)家之技術(shù)和市場(chǎng)。

當(dāng)然，第一輪工業(yè)化成果又可提供一定機(jī)器和知識(shí)支持，消費(fèi)品工業(yè)得以在機(jī)制最為靈活的鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)層面迅速發(fā)展。此為中國(guó)工業(yè)化第二輪突破，相對(duì)于第一輪，實(shí)際上在技術(shù)上降級(jí)了，但大量吸納勞動(dòng)力，大幅度改善民生。

第三輪突破始于新世紀(jì)之初。傳統(tǒng)政府觀念開(kāi)始發(fā)揮作用，本來(lái)熱衷于繼續(xù)革命的強(qiáng)政府，將其能力用于建設(shè)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，輔導(dǎo)產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展。于是，工業(yè)產(chǎn)值持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)，并沿產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈向上攀爬，終于形成全球規(guī)模最大、體系最完整的制造業(yè)部門(mén)，世界經(jīng)濟(jì)版圖因此而大變。

今日中國(guó)已在工業(yè)化第四輪突破中，美國(guó)人因此而恐懼，從而改變了兩國(guó)關(guān)系的基調(diào)，世界秩序進(jìn)入大調(diào)整期。

總之，世界歷史第二階段兩百年間歷史的樞軸是中西位置的反轉(zhuǎn)：十九世紀(jì)初期以降的一百多年，西方向上走，中國(guó)往下走；二戰(zhàn)以后，中國(guó)向上走，西方往下走。今日似已逼近雙方移位之臨界點(diǎn)，逐漸突破世界舊秩序的容納力。

▍美國(guó)民粹化，世界舊秩序崩潰

世界舊秩序正在崩潰中。其源在中國(guó)的興起，既有世界秩序架構(gòu)難以容納；但導(dǎo)火索則是冷戰(zhàn)后美國(guó)一家獨(dú)大及其無(wú)法承受成本之后的倉(cāng)皇失措。

歷史上，羅馬的力量不能及于印度，更無(wú)法越過(guò)蔥嶺；在另一方向上，漢唐的力量即便勉強(qiáng)越過(guò)蔥嶺，也難保持。故世界保持基本秩序的結(jié)構(gòu)性條件是，不由單一中心統(tǒng)治。

工業(yè)化之后交通和戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)技術(shù)的提升亦未改變這一鐵律：二戰(zhàn)以前，西方列強(qiáng)散布世界各地，相互爭(zhēng)奪，看似混亂，實(shí)則分擔(dān)全球統(tǒng)治成本，西方作為整體反而可對(duì)世界實(shí)施有效統(tǒng)治。二戰(zhàn)后，蘇聯(lián)興起，與西方形成冷戰(zhàn)格局。兩個(gè)陣營(yíng)各有其經(jīng)營(yíng)范圍，同樣有效維護(hù)了世界秩序。

冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束，世界進(jìn)入一霸獨(dú)強(qiáng)的格局。美國(guó)在西方文明中立國(guó)最晚，也是西方人發(fā)現(xiàn)的最后的“新大陸”，其人口最多，注定成為西方文明統(tǒng)治世界之最后一站。

它確實(shí)得到了這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)，也曾信心十足地宣稱(chēng)歷史已經(jīng)終結(jié)。然而，雄心繞不過(guò)成本的硬約束，當(dāng)美國(guó)一家統(tǒng)治，世界秩序立刻走向松動(dòng)、潰散，所謂“美國(guó)治下的和平”（Pax Americana）短暫得不足以寫(xiě)入未來(lái)的世界史。

回顧歷史即可發(fā)現(xiàn)，美國(guó)之崛起大部分因?yàn)槠溥h(yuǎn)在世界島外的地緣優(yōu)勢(shì)：列強(qiáng)爭(zhēng)奪世界島控制權(quán)，接連引爆一戰(zhàn)、二戰(zhàn)，美國(guó)在列強(qiáng)殘破時(shí)介入而僥幸取勝。此后，西方列強(qiáng)實(shí)力喪盡、精神崩潰，不得不把西方文明的“家父權(quán)”交給美國(guó)，并從各個(gè)方面積極配合美國(guó)對(duì)抗蘇聯(lián)陣營(yíng)。

即便如此，在朝鮮半島上，美國(guó)拼湊的所謂“聯(lián)合國(guó)軍”與國(guó)力貧弱的中國(guó)直接交手，亦無(wú)力取勝。所謂美國(guó)世紀(jì)的歷史證明，其實(shí)在沒(méi)有直接統(tǒng)治世界島的能力，只能實(shí)施離岸平衡，如同當(dāng)年英國(guó)平衡歐陸。只要世界島上諸強(qiáng)相安，不給其操縱機(jī)會(huì)，其統(tǒng)治力散布全世界，必耗散至于虛脫。

此即當(dāng)下美國(guó)之困境所在，面對(duì)獨(dú)家維護(hù)世界秩序的責(zé)任，美國(guó)人力不從心，在小布什、克林頓短暫的歷史終結(jié)快感后，奧巴馬時(shí)代即開(kāi)始戰(zhàn)略收縮，逐個(gè)拋棄其統(tǒng)治全球的重負(fù)：拋棄非洲，對(duì)南美心不在焉；在重返中東還是亞太再平衡之間搖擺不定。

全球統(tǒng)治權(quán)的短暫榮耀也誘發(fā)其內(nèi)潰：美國(guó)發(fā)展出在全球范圍內(nèi)配置資本的金融體系，由此收獲不少帝國(guó)統(tǒng)治紅利。但“福兮禍之所倚”，金融業(yè)與其所豢養(yǎng)的全球性快錢(qián)行業(yè)，即以網(wǎng)絡(luò)和醫(yī)藥為主的所謂高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)畸形繁榮，帶來(lái)“去工業(yè)化”，其所培育的中下階層生計(jì)大受影響。

受制于中國(guó)等新興國(guó)家的自保措施，此金融體系又無(wú)法有效榨取全部帝國(guó)紅利，外部收益不足以填補(bǔ)國(guó)內(nèi)去工業(yè)化各階層的損失。結(jié)果，美國(guó)內(nèi)部的收入分配結(jié)構(gòu)趨于兩極化，階層、集團(tuán)間的撕裂、對(duì)立日益嚴(yán)重。

尤其嚴(yán)重的是，其國(guó)家主體族群白人清教徒比例快速萎縮，焦慮心態(tài)使其政治行為日益激進(jìn)，如茶黨興起、支持特朗普，對(duì)非主流人群和外部世界的敵意持續(xù)強(qiáng)化；而這必將刺激非主流人群的激進(jìn)化，很快就會(huì)有民主黨的特朗普出現(xiàn)。

去工業(yè)化是美國(guó)危機(jī)的根源。西方列強(qiáng)之所以在十九世紀(jì)可橫行全球，包括欺辱中國(guó)，主要因?yàn)槠溆袕?qiáng)大工業(yè)體系所生產(chǎn)之堅(jiān)船利炮。去工業(yè)化意味著其堅(jiān)船利炮的供應(yīng)不足，即便在美國(guó)，其軍事工業(yè)體系也已殘缺，或由于配套不全而成本過(guò)高，以至于完全無(wú)力投入另一場(chǎng)軍備競(jìng)賽中。

美國(guó)精英已意識(shí)到此問(wèn)題之嚴(yán)重性，奧巴馬有心推動(dòng)再工業(yè)化，但在“否決政治”僵局中無(wú)任何進(jìn)展。特朗普應(yīng)運(yùn)而生，解決此問(wèn)題的愿望更為急迫，“讓美國(guó)再次強(qiáng)大”首先就是讓美國(guó)再次成為第一工業(yè)國(guó)。為此，特朗普的施政風(fēng)格打破成例，別創(chuàng)一格。

但特朗普能實(shí)現(xiàn)其意圖否？很難。只要金融等“末業(yè)”依然可借全球體系從外部獲取高額利潤(rùn)，資本就不可能轉(zhuǎn)入國(guó)內(nèi)工業(yè)和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。美國(guó)欲復(fù)興其工業(yè)，得像漢武帝那樣，先摧破金融豪強(qiáng)，但這可能嗎？

與美國(guó)的去工業(yè)化相反，中國(guó)依托堅(jiān)實(shí)的全產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈基礎(chǔ)，穩(wěn)步推進(jìn)其工業(yè)化第四輪突破，攀升制造業(yè)頂端。美國(guó)人終究是相信硬力量的，而中國(guó)的力量即將壓倒美國(guó)。美國(guó)精英不能不產(chǎn)生恐懼之情，乃宣布中國(guó)為“對(duì)手”，中國(guó)關(guān)系的性質(zhì)由之大變。

長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)，在西方列強(qiáng)中，美國(guó)人對(duì)中國(guó)似有特殊好感，頗多憐憫之心，有時(shí)頗為慷慨。這可能源于其神教福音派心態(tài)：他們相信自己在山巔之城，有責(zé)任傳播神的真理，而中國(guó)是世界上最大的國(guó)家，中國(guó)人看起來(lái)文明、溫順，或可順受其信仰和價(jià)值。當(dāng)初美國(guó)的G2提議也是讓中國(guó)擔(dān)當(dāng)其統(tǒng)治世界的服帖助手。顯然，此期待出于其一神教的傲慢與對(duì)歷史的無(wú)知。

中國(guó)是人類(lèi)文明兩大類(lèi)型之一，幾千年都在走自己的路，即便在其最艱難時(shí)刻，即便在其全力學(xué)習(xí)蘇聯(lián)、西方之術(shù)時(shí)，仍保有文明自覺(jué)，未脫出其道。今天經(jīng)濟(jì)上的成功以及由此而有的重整世界秩序的牛刀小試，只是歷史恢復(fù)其常態(tài)而已。

但缺乏歷史感的美國(guó)人無(wú)法接受這一點(diǎn)，對(duì)中國(guó)的憐憫之情一轉(zhuǎn)而為怨恨之意，一如傳教者遭遇拒絕皈依者的反應(yīng)。大體可以確認(rèn)，美國(guó)精英群體對(duì)中國(guó)的好感已流失殆盡，怨恨中國(guó)已成共識(shí)——還有恐懼。故美國(guó)將會(huì)運(yùn)用一切手段擾亂中國(guó)的發(fā)展和影響力擴(kuò)大。

當(dāng)然，美國(guó)的做法讓正在恢復(fù)其力量和自信的中國(guó)堅(jiān)定了擺脫美國(guó)體系的決心。可以確信：未來(lái)中美之間將以斗爭(zhēng)為主。

由此，世界舊秩序的根基已經(jīng)搖動(dòng)：“美國(guó)治下的和平”意味著美國(guó)容許中國(guó)在其所維護(hù)的體系中發(fā)展，現(xiàn)在美國(guó)已不欲容納中國(guó)，則中國(guó)不能不另起爐灶，自行建立世界新秩序。美國(guó)人宣布，其國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略重歸于應(yīng)對(duì)“大國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”——說(shuō)對(duì)了。

盡管如此，兩國(guó)的歷史和經(jīng)驗(yàn)將使此斗爭(zhēng)不成為毀滅性的。首先，在地理上，兩國(guó)相隔過(guò)于遼遠(yuǎn)；其次，就國(guó)家結(jié)構(gòu)而言，美國(guó)為海洋國(guó)家，長(zhǎng)于離岸平衡，無(wú)力深入大陸；中國(guó)是海陸復(fù)合型國(guó)家，戰(zhàn)略縱深極大。

這兩個(gè)因素讓美國(guó)無(wú)力對(duì)中國(guó)發(fā)動(dòng)全面戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)；即便其在西太發(fā)動(dòng)海戰(zhàn)，亦無(wú)勝算。

第三，就國(guó)性而言，美國(guó)的底色是“商業(yè)共和國(guó)”，基于成本收益計(jì)算行動(dòng)；中國(guó)則有處理蠻夷戎狄問(wèn)題的豐富經(jīng)驗(yàn)。這些決定了兩國(guó)間直接決戰(zhàn)完全可以避免。

就此而言，中美易位，大大不同于過(guò)去幾百年發(fā)生在歐洲大陸的霸權(quán)易位。狹窄的歐洲確不能兼容二主，但寬闊的太平洋卻完全可以。這構(gòu)成兩國(guó)關(guān)系的底線。

故中美兩國(guó)將會(huì)展開(kāi)全方位的大國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，而只要中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)和軍事力量持續(xù)提升，并在具體問(wèn)題上充分展示自己有動(dòng)用使用這些毀滅性力量的堅(jiān)定決心，美國(guó)將會(huì)如其原宗主國(guó)英國(guó)一樣，在恰當(dāng)?shù)臅r(shí)間，在其無(wú)力立足的地方理性退卻。

直白而言，美國(guó)將會(huì)在中國(guó)的擠壓下，從東亞、西太退出，那將是世界新秩序告成之時(shí)。

這幾年來(lái)，中國(guó)之所為已使美國(guó)部分收效，部分美國(guó)人已認(rèn)識(shí)到中國(guó)的力量和決心，并調(diào)整戰(zhàn)略，轉(zhuǎn)而對(duì)盟國(guó)下手，在同盟體系上開(kāi)源節(jié)流。

這正是川普上任以來(lái)對(duì)盟國(guó)之所為：為美國(guó)短暫利益，川普毫不猶豫地退出、破壞其自二戰(zhàn)以來(lái)所建立的聯(lián)盟體系，反復(fù)要求盟國(guó)分擔(dān)其維護(hù)秩序的成本，進(jìn)而對(duì)其盟國(guó)提出“公平貿(mào)易”的要求。

世間本無(wú)所謂基于共同價(jià)值的“民主聯(lián)盟”，美國(guó)建立聯(lián)盟體系之目的從來(lái)是為了追求自己的利益，只不過(guò)借助盟友應(yīng)對(duì)強(qiáng)大的敵人，但維護(hù)同盟是需要成本的。一旦同盟的成本大于收益，聯(lián)盟體系即走向解體。

由此，西方將被打回原形，重回二戰(zhàn)之前的狀態(tài)，而且更糟糕：這一次，不是為爭(zhēng)奪殖民地、瓜分世界，而是為了本國(guó)的生存。因而，西方世界有可能退回早期現(xiàn)代列國(guó)爭(zhēng)雄狀態(tài)，盡管未必通過(guò)熱戰(zhàn)。

美國(guó)為獲利而不擇手段，致其價(jià)值體系迅速崩潰。自威爾遜帶領(lǐng)美國(guó)走上世界體系領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的地位始，價(jià)值觀成為美國(guó)感召力之淵藪：當(dāng)年威爾遜曾感動(dòng)過(guò)無(wú)數(shù)中國(guó)知識(shí)分子，盡管很快就幻滅；今天在中國(guó)，美國(guó)的普世價(jià)值神話在相當(dāng)比例中國(guó)精英中仍有感召力，但川普讓其一一現(xiàn)形。美國(guó)回到其進(jìn)行殖民征服、開(kāi)發(fā)西部的鄙陋狀態(tài)。

美國(guó)的思想力也明顯不濟(jì)。當(dāng)然，美國(guó)人本無(wú)深刻思想，惟歐洲兩次大戰(zhàn)迫使眾多思想者流亡美國(guó)，在美國(guó)發(fā)展出若干思想。

但冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后，其人紛紛離世，此后在所謂歷史終結(jié)的二十年中，美國(guó)與西方未再涌現(xiàn)卓越的思想人物；以至于面對(duì)當(dāng)下困境，其應(yīng)對(duì)策略無(wú)非是翻出過(guò)去的方案或重新組合，日顯鄙陋——川普及其支持者最為典型。

對(duì)此鄙陋，有人作震驚狀，但這本是美國(guó)傳統(tǒng)：清教徒為建立所謂山巔之城，消滅了印第安人；為美國(guó)制定所謂自由憲法的立國(guó)者中頗多奴隸主，并把奴隸制堂皇寫(xiě)入憲法；《聯(lián)邦黨人文集》為了保障自由設(shè)計(jì)了復(fù)雜的分權(quán)制度，但論及國(guó)家間戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)和貿(mào)易則冷酷無(wú)情；美國(guó)人迷信持槍權(quán)，為自由賦予每人以殺人權(quán)。

所以，川普沒(méi)有發(fā)明美國(guó)，只是讓其隱而不彰的“商業(yè)共和國(guó)”傳統(tǒng)再度顯明，這是漢密爾頓當(dāng)初對(duì)美國(guó)的定性，而在西方，商人經(jīng)常同時(shí)是劫掠者、海盜。

上任不到兩年，特朗普已帶領(lǐng)美國(guó)大體完成其面孔轉(zhuǎn)換：快速褪去涂抹在其外表的理想主義光彩，從所謂的“價(jià)值共和國(guó)”轉(zhuǎn)為貨真價(jià)實(shí)的“商業(yè)共和國(guó)”。這個(gè)美國(guó)不準(zhǔn)備繼續(xù)承擔(dān)維護(hù)世界秩序的責(zé)任，“美國(guó)優(yōu)先”口號(hào)清楚表明這一點(diǎn)——而此孤立主義、也即赤裸裸的利己主義同樣在美國(guó)傳統(tǒng)中。

或許可以說(shuō)，內(nèi)外情形使得美國(guó)政治和民情正在民粹化和法西斯化的下坡路上狂奔，特朗普不過(guò)踩了幾腳油門(mén)而已。

法西斯主義產(chǎn)生的前提是本來(lái)處在中間的諸階層在復(fù)雜難測(cè)的全球化網(wǎng)絡(luò)遭受損害而陷于絕望，煽動(dòng)者沖破政治建制，刻意秉持反智姿態(tài)，直接訴諸“人民”，承諾拋開(kāi)一切成規(guī)，作出超人的雄姿拯救“人民”。

還有，反復(fù)指控前任的愚蠢懦弱，用幼稚的詞匯描述國(guó)際關(guān)系，把內(nèi)部分配不公解釋為外部對(duì)本國(guó)的掠奪，不惜與全世界為敵，情緒化地拋棄盟約。此即法西斯主義之構(gòu)成要素，今日美國(guó)不已幾乎全部具備？

回顧歷史即可發(fā)現(xiàn)，美國(guó)立國(guó)與德國(guó)納粹成立之根本價(jià)值，只有一紙之隔：“美國(guó)例外論”近似于德國(guó)納粹的“雅利安種族優(yōu)越論”，這是美國(guó)法西斯化之精神根基。

特朗普是美國(guó)法西斯化之始作俑者，其他政客在震驚之余，見(jiàn)其獲得越來(lái)越多支持，大眾政治的機(jī)制必將誘導(dǎo)其群起效仿，法西斯化程度將日益加深。

只是由于美國(guó)規(guī)模遠(yuǎn)大于當(dāng)年的德國(guó)、意大利，內(nèi)部族群也較為多元，故其法西斯化或許難以席卷全國(guó)，而很可能致其潰解。

世界秩序由強(qiáng)國(guó)維系。幾個(gè)主要角色中，歐盟的進(jìn)一步凝聚已不可能，將日益碎片化；俄羅斯將持續(xù)衰落，日益成為原材料出口國(guó)；美國(guó)已無(wú)意、也無(wú)力支撐戰(zhàn)后全球各領(lǐng)域多邊體系和同盟，轉(zhuǎn)向重建雙邊體系，以最大化其具體利益。而在原來(lái)的體系中并不居于中心的中國(guó)，卻正在快速壯大。

可見(jiàn)，二戰(zhàn)后形成的世界秩序，或者說(shuō)，兩百年來(lái)的世界秩序，已走向崩解，問(wèn)題只在于崩解速度有多快，替代的新秩序是什么，能否及時(shí)涌現(xiàn)、起效以免出現(xiàn)大范圍的嚴(yán)重失序。

▍中國(guó)重構(gòu)世界秩序

在舊秩序解體的同時(shí)，世界新秩序已在醞釀中，主要的生成性力量是經(jīng)濟(jì)總量已居第二、而文明類(lèi)型不同的中國(guó)。

此系“天降大任于斯人也”，無(wú)可推脫。對(duì)世界日趨失序，列國(guó)中最不能無(wú)視者，中國(guó)也；因?yàn)槭澜绻媸?，中?guó)將是最大受害者，上升之路將止步，且未來(lái)治理世界的成本將大增?？傆腥苏f(shuō)中國(guó)應(yīng)繼續(xù)韜光養(yǎng)晦，此乃刻舟求劍耳。

《中庸》曰：“君子之中庸也，君子而時(shí)中?！泵骱踔杏怪勒?，當(dāng)止則止，當(dāng)行則行。韜光養(yǎng)晦者，時(shí)也；起而重整秩序，時(shí)也。不知時(shí)者，不足與論國(guó)事。

今世惟有中國(guó)有重整新秩序之能力。一方面，中國(guó)是世界上最大的國(guó)家，更在其悠久中有治理世界的充分經(jīng)驗(yàn)：以中國(guó)之大而多樣，本身就是天下或曰世界秩序；中國(guó)曾建立從中亞到南洋、橫跨陸海的天下秩序，此經(jīng)驗(yàn)在世界歷史上是罕見(jiàn)的。

另一方面，中國(guó)也是現(xiàn)代的。西人塑造世界秩序，憑其現(xiàn)代力量，而過(guò)去一百年間，中國(guó)循西方邏輯變法。而中國(guó)之所以成功，因?yàn)槲鞣降默F(xiàn)代觀念和制度至少部分地淵源于中國(guó)，中國(guó)內(nèi)在于現(xiàn)代性中。

由此可以理解一個(gè)引人注目的事實(shí)：環(huán)顧全球，惟有東亞儒家文化圈各國(guó)完成了工業(yè)化，比較順利地建立類(lèi)似于西方的現(xiàn)代治理體系。

因此，中國(guó)正在塑造的世界新秩序不是全新的，因?yàn)閮烧咴诂F(xiàn)代性上是相通的，可保持連續(xù)性。

當(dāng)然，西方接受中國(guó)思想必加以西方化，故多有偏而不正之處。中國(guó)塑造新世界秩序可對(duì)其予以矯正，綜合運(yùn)用古典、現(xiàn)代智慧，矯正現(xiàn)有世界秩序之偏失，其大義有三：

第一，恢復(fù)全球均衡發(fā)展。

世界島上展開(kāi)的古典秩序偏于大陸一端；西方列強(qiáng)普遍為海洋國(guó)家，其所主導(dǎo)的世界秩序偏于海洋一端，由此導(dǎo)致世界島逐漸塌陷，昔日文明中心反成世界禍亂之源。

美國(guó)治下的和平未能解決這一問(wèn)題，其孤懸世界島外，慣于離岸平衡，不能深入內(nèi)陸，沒(méi)有與文明傳統(tǒng)深厚之各國(guó)打交道的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。

故其只能維護(hù)海洋秩序，不能維護(hù)世界秩序，甚至經(jīng)常因?yàn)闊o(wú)知，貿(mào)然闖入世界島中央，以粗暴手法操作；引發(fā)混亂之后，又束手無(wú)策，迅速撤離，世界之腹心乃長(zhǎng)期處在潰瘍、潰爛、失血狀態(tài)。

中國(guó)塑造新世界秩序，必當(dāng)執(zhí)兩用中。中國(guó)自古即在陸海之際，兼顧海陸，最為均衡：漢唐中國(guó)積累了交往陸上文明的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，宋明以來(lái)中國(guó)深入海洋貿(mào)易體系。

正是據(jù)此歷史經(jīng)驗(yàn)，當(dāng)代中國(guó)提出“一帶一路”倡議，其最大優(yōu)點(diǎn)在于涵攝世界島和海洋，包容舊世界和新世界：“一帶”旨在恢復(fù)世界島秩序，“一路”旨在安頓海洋秩序。

這是人類(lèi)提出的第一個(gè)完整的、均衡的世界秩序方案，中國(guó)已為此建立相應(yīng)機(jī)制：上合組織初步形成解決世界島問(wèn)題的架構(gòu)，若納入德國(guó)，即告完備。至于安頓海洋秩序，不必建立專(zhuān)門(mén)組織，畢竟，美國(guó)的核心影響在海洋上，中國(guó)可與之協(xié)調(diào)海洋秩序。

第二，馴化資本主義，倡導(dǎo)厚生主義。

西方賴(lài)以強(qiáng)富強(qiáng)的體制為“資本主義”，扎根于西方海盜-商人傳統(tǒng)和殖民征服傳統(tǒng)，以獲取貨幣利潤(rùn)為驅(qū)動(dòng)力，以畸形發(fā)達(dá)的金融體系經(jīng)營(yíng)資本，以貿(mào)易為樞紐。對(duì)待他者，以離岸手法操作，以獵獲廉價(jià)資源或市場(chǎng)為樞紐。它可以占有世界，卻不能耕作世界，機(jī)會(huì)主義傾向嚴(yán)重。

西人將資本主義推到全世界，但在沒(méi)有殖民紅利的國(guó)家，這套制度是自相矛盾的，無(wú)從正常運(yùn)作。故自十九世紀(jì)西方統(tǒng)治世界以來(lái)，西方以外實(shí)現(xiàn)工業(yè)化、現(xiàn)代化的國(guó)家，除儒家文化圈外幾乎沒(méi)有，這一事實(shí)表明，資本主義不是普世的。

中國(guó)圣賢所立經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)模式，用孫中山先生的詞說(shuō)是“民生主義”，或可謂之“厚生主義”。其大綱為《尚書(shū)?大禹謨》“正德、利用、厚生、惟和”，重視“開(kāi)物”、“利用”，也即重視物質(zhì)的生產(chǎn)、利用和分配，以讓人改進(jìn)生活，且生生不已。

為此采取“崇本抑末”政策，以使商業(yè)、金融活動(dòng)服務(wù)于生產(chǎn)和民生。中國(guó)已初步應(yīng)用這一模式于世界，“一帶一路”倡議中的經(jīng)濟(jì)方略與此前西方國(guó)家有很大不同，重視授人以漁，改善基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，推動(dòng)工業(yè)化。

中國(guó)目前是世界工廠，產(chǎn)業(yè)正在升級(jí)，未來(lái)將重構(gòu)世界分工體系：向上，接納西方國(guó)家尖端制造業(yè)提供的部件，向下，梯次轉(zhuǎn)移普通制造業(yè)到不發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家，主要是非洲。

隨著中國(guó)成為全球最大消費(fèi)市場(chǎng)，比較均衡地在發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和不發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家之間分配這個(gè)市場(chǎng)，此即傳統(tǒng)“朝貢貿(mào)易”之要旨所在；比較均衡地從全世界不同地區(qū)獲得能源；在世界范圍內(nèi)倡導(dǎo)崇本抑末政策。

第三，走向“一體多元”的世界格局。

歐洲列強(qiáng)建立世界秩序，普遍求“同”，傾向使用暴力，必定制造敵人。美國(guó)受其清教影響，熱衷于價(jià)值一律，以普世價(jià)值強(qiáng)加世界一致，凡與自己觀念不同者概斥為“邪惡”，視為敵人。

故當(dāng)福山高談歷史終結(jié)時(shí)，導(dǎo)彈正橫飛于中東。西方文明以求同始，以撕裂終，根本無(wú)從建立普遍秩序。至于作為其反彈的文化多元主義，已致西方各國(guó)內(nèi)部撕裂、解體，遑論世界秩序。

中國(guó)則不同，《尚書(shū)?堯典》描述堯舜締造中國(guó)和天下之道曰：“克明俊德，以親九族。九族既睦，平章百姓。百姓昭明，協(xié)和萬(wàn)邦?！?/p>

幾千年來(lái)，中國(guó)人以“一個(gè)天、多個(gè)神，諸神統(tǒng)于天”或以“一個(gè)文教，多種神教”為本，吸納多元宗教、族群，而以敬天或文教一體之，從而構(gòu)建“一體多元”的國(guó)家和天下格局，這是唯一可行的通往普遍秩序之道。

此秩序之構(gòu)建不是通過(guò)暴力征服，也不通過(guò)傳教或推行普世價(jià)值讓他者變成自己，而是承認(rèn)他者的自主，“修文德以來(lái)之，既來(lái)之，則安之”[6]。大體上，今天中國(guó)就是循此和而不同之道建立和維護(hù)國(guó)際組織，滋長(zhǎng)世界新秩序，也即天下秩序。

依據(jù)圣人“協(xié)和萬(wàn)邦”以平天下之道，可推定中國(guó)引領(lǐng)生成天下秩序的方式和基本特征如下：

第一，天下秩序不是一次性構(gòu)建的而是漸進(jìn)生成的?！爸茈m舊邦，其命維新”，可用以描述中國(guó)引領(lǐng)形成新秩序的程序：周本為舊邦，長(zhǎng)期行德化，首先影響周邊邦國(guó)，逐漸擴(kuò)大其影響力，到文王三分天下有其二，諸侯歸于周而不歸殷，乃有殷周之易位。中國(guó)人重整天下秩序亦將循此漸進(jìn)之道，而避免與現(xiàn)有霸權(quán)對(duì)撞。

第二，維系正在形成的天下體系，以德禮為先。天下體系只是“協(xié)和萬(wàn)邦”，而非建立緊密聯(lián)盟，更非強(qiáng)求同質(zhì)化。

維系各國(guó)關(guān)系的首先是德、禮，“修文德以來(lái)之”，此文德包括道義，更包括經(jīng)濟(jì)惠澤；同時(shí)，協(xié)同各國(guó)建立禮治。禮治區(qū)別于現(xiàn)有國(guó)際法體系之處在于，除明晰各主體之權(quán)利、義務(wù)，還強(qiáng)調(diào)互親敦睦，建立情感紐帶。

第三，天下秩序不求覆蓋全世界。世界太大，任何單一國(guó)家均無(wú)力有效治理。圣人深明此義，故天下體系從未試圖覆蓋當(dāng)時(shí)所知全世界，后世亦然：鄭和下西洋遭遇眾多邦國(guó)，但天子未殖民征服之，亦未將其全部納入朝貢體系，而讓其自主抉擇。

中國(guó)人不追求所有國(guó)家立刻進(jìn)入同一體系，天下秩序是沒(méi)有終點(diǎn)的歷史過(guò)程。只要臺(tái)灣統(tǒng)一、美國(guó)退出東亞、西太，對(duì)中國(guó)人而言，世界新秩序即告成型。中國(guó)如此節(jié)制，可避免魚(yú)死網(wǎng)破的霸權(quán)之爭(zhēng)。

第四，完整的世界新秩序?qū)⒋嬖趦扇齻€(gè)區(qū)域性體系。中國(guó)是海陸復(fù)合型國(guó)家，可運(yùn)用其傳統(tǒng)智慧，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)西太、大半個(gè)世界島、非洲等區(qū)域?yàn)樘煜麦w系，美國(guó)等有共同耶教信仰的大西洋海洋國(guó)家將別成其普遍世界體系，世界島中央則可有伊斯蘭世界秩序。這樣，以其固有文明為本，未來(lái)世界可有2.5個(gè)區(qū)域性體系。

此類(lèi)似于亨廷頓的文明劃分，但未必是文明沖突。亨廷頓以西人神教思維看待世界，不了解中國(guó)文明。

隨著中國(guó)影響力日益增長(zhǎng)，可在塑造世界新秩序過(guò)程中發(fā)揮更大作用，則可以其智慧，避免與其他兩個(gè)體系陷入對(duì)抗，且緩解另兩個(gè)體系之對(duì)抗。

現(xiàn)實(shí)可能性在于，中國(guó)是海陸復(fù)合型國(guó)家，與另1.5個(gè)體系有價(jià)值和利益高度重疊之處，可作跨體系的“協(xié)和”?！爸袊?guó)”可以成為居于區(qū)域性體系之中的協(xié)和之國(guó)，從而形成多元一體的世界新秩序。

為此，中國(guó)可逐漸構(gòu)建逐層嵌套、由內(nèi)而外的復(fù)合的世界治理架構(gòu)：

最內(nèi)層，重建東亞秩序。傳統(tǒng)上，朝鮮半島、越南為中國(guó)最親近的藩屬，日本也深受影響。

二戰(zhàn)后，東亞儒家文化圈成為全球唯一成片完成現(xiàn)代化者，但其間關(guān)系破碎，聽(tīng)命外人，與其經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)達(dá)繁榮形成鮮明對(duì)比。原因是中國(guó)貧弱，無(wú)力發(fā)揮主導(dǎo)作用，聽(tīng)任美國(guó)、蘇聯(lián)等外部力量操縱。

中國(guó)整頓世界秩序，必由此開(kāi)始，且其目標(biāo)超越國(guó)際關(guān)系，而是帶領(lǐng)韓朝、新、越、日等國(guó)，依托共同的儒家文化傳統(tǒng)，逐漸恢復(fù)儒家式治理體系，協(xié)調(diào)采取民生主義政策，為全世界樹(shù)立全新的繁榮、文明標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，如同此前西方各國(guó)為全世界標(biāo)桿。

隨著中國(guó)力量增強(qiáng)，美國(guó)不能不逐漸退出，這一進(jìn)程將以出人意料的高速展開(kāi)。

中間層以“上合組織”為依托，安頓世界島中央秩序。該組織已吸納印度、巴基斯坦、伊朗，進(jìn)一步可吸納土耳其、德國(guó)。

俄羅斯的經(jīng)濟(jì)缺乏潛力，其全球影響力將持續(xù)衰減，將收縮于中亞及其周邊，故將日益重視上合組織，可協(xié)與中國(guó)共同協(xié)和伊斯蘭世界各國(guó)，化解世界島上諸古典文明各國(guó)之間的緊張，避免沖突，進(jìn)而尋求共同發(fā)展。

這是大大擴(kuò)展了的“新西域”，關(guān)乎中國(guó)西部安全和繁榮；又在世界島中央，此處穩(wěn)，則全球大局不亂；由此，美國(guó)無(wú)從施展其離岸操縱術(shù)，其全球支配力自然衰退，此為盡快形成世界新秩序之關(guān)鍵。

最外層是制度化的一帶一路倡議，涵括整個(gè)世界，“一帶”以上合組織為主要治理平臺(tái)，一路則以東南亞各國(guó)、非洲為重點(diǎn)。

尤其是非洲，人口眾多，自然條件尚可，位于歐洲之南緣，介于中國(guó)、美國(guó)之間，隨著中國(guó)工業(yè)體系向上升級(jí)，產(chǎn)能外溢，非洲是唯一可以接納的沃土，是為構(gòu)造中國(guó)主導(dǎo)的全球生產(chǎn)體系之布局關(guān)鍵。

至于與西方體系的協(xié)和，則可在G20平臺(tái)上。

▍結(jié)語(yǔ)

人類(lèi)文明大體可分兩大類(lèi)型，故考察世界秩序之演變和前景當(dāng)以中國(guó)和西方之浮沉升降為中心。

在早期現(xiàn)代，西方受中國(guó)啟發(fā)；一百多年前，中國(guó)學(xué)習(xí)西方；中國(guó)的復(fù)興，導(dǎo)致西方主導(dǎo)的世界舊秩序崩潰；新秩序的生成，必以中國(guó)為中心。

五百年必有王者興。把握這五百年的世界歷史，既要理解西方現(xiàn)代觀念和制度的優(yōu)長(zhǎng)與限度，也要理解中國(guó)文明內(nèi)在的現(xiàn)代性質(zhì)及其在現(xiàn)代之新生轉(zhuǎn)進(jìn)。

《文化縱橫》國(guó)際傳播系列由三大洲社會(huì)研究所（Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, 網(wǎng)站：www.thetricontinental.org）和東聲（Dongsheng News，網(wǎng)站：www.dongshengnews.org)協(xié)作翻譯并制作，有英語(yǔ)、西語(yǔ)、葡語(yǔ)三個(gè)版本。每期根據(jù)不同主題，從《文化縱橫》雜志過(guò)往發(fā)表文章中，選擇3-5篇文章進(jìn)行編譯，預(yù)計(jì)每季度發(fā)布一期。2023年第1期主題為“重構(gòu)現(xiàn)代世界體系”，主要分析全球緊張局勢(shì)加劇背景下的俄烏戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的全球影響，追溯中西關(guān)系的歷史軌跡，并探討團(tuán)結(jié)廣大第三世界國(guó)家、推動(dòng)構(gòu)建新型國(guó)際體系的可能性。